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This dissertation asks three fundamental questions about representation in American cities.
Who serves as mayor? How do voters select mayors? And, do mayors shape policy? Responsible
for funding and providing essential services, municipal governments have a huge impact on the
public’s safety and quality of life. As chief elected officials, mayors are unquestionably important
but also understudied political actors. A number of rich and detailed case studies provide valuable
insights on individual mayors and their influence, but quantitative cross-city studies have yielded
mixed findings on mayors’ abilities to affect outcomes. To date, efforts to comprehensively and
systematically study mayors have been hampered by a lack of data.
To overcome these data limitations, I amassed an original dataset that includes detailed back-
ground information on more than 3,200 mayoral candidates, covering nearly 300 U.S. cities over
the last 60 years. My data reveal that mayors, like politicians at higher levels of government, are
not very representative of their constituents—they are much more likely to be white and male, with
prior political experience and white-collar careers. Business owners and executives are especially
well represented in American city halls, accounting for about 32% candidates and mayors.
This study provides compelling new evidence that mayors can and do influence policy out-
comes. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that business executive mayors shape
spending priorities, leading to significantly lower levels of spending on redistributive programs
and greater investment in infrastructure. Perhaps counterintuitively, electing a business executive
mayor appears to have little effect on the overall size of government. However, suggestive evidence
indicates that they may increase local revenue, but in the form of fees and charges rather than taxes.
My findings suggest that business executives preside over policy changes with implications for the
distribution of both costs and benefits of local government.
In another component of the dissertation, I employ a conjoint survey experiment to investi-
gate why voters so often elect business executives. The experimental results suggest that a can-
didate’s experience as a business owner or executive is likely to influence voters preferences and
evaluations. These findings are consistent with longstanding claims that voters rely on candidate
characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, or incumbency, as information shortcuts in the absence of
party cues. Notably, the cues they use may vary with party identification. In nonpartisan contests,
political experience has an even stronger influence on the preferences of Democratic respondents,
while Republicans give more weight to occupation.
Overall, my experimental results suggest that electoral institutions may interact with voters’
preferences to shape descriptive representation. At the same time, my analyses of new obser-
vational data on mayoral candidates document striking deficits of descriptive representation in
America’s cities and suggest that who serves in office has meaningful policy consequences.
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Questions about representation are fundamental to the study of politics. This dissertation examines
representation in the context of American cities, addressing three essential questions about mayors
and local politics. Who serves as mayor? How do voters select mayors? And, does it matter
who voters choose? That is, to what extent do mayors systematically influence policy outcomes?
Although city halls may lack the prestige of the White House or the U.S. Capitol, policy choices
and outcomes in American cities are hardly trivial. Combined, U.S. local governments account
for over $1.6 trillion in spending per year—nearly 10% of the nation’s GDP—and raise more than
$900 billion in annual revenue from local sources (as of 2012; see Barnett, Sheckells and Tydings
2014). Responsible for funding and providing essential services, municipal governments also have
a huge impact on the public’s safety and quality of life.
As chief elected officials, mayors are unquestionably important but also understudied political
actors. A number of rich and detailed case studies provide valuable insights on individual mayors
and their influence. These studies tend to portray individual mayors as crucial actors with consider-
able sway over how their cities respond to the challenges of local governance (e.g., Ferman 1985;
Stone 1989; DeLeon 1995; Fuchs 1992; Inman 1995; Bissinger 1997). In contrast, quantitative
cross-city studies have yielded mixed findings on mayors’ abilities to affect outcomes (e.g., Fer-
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reira and Gyourko 2009, 2014; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Hopkins and McCabe 2012). To date,
however, efforts to understand the role and influence of mayors have been hampered by a lack of
data to support the comprehensive and systematic study of mayors across cities and over time.
To overcome existing data limitations, I collected and compiled data from newspapers, govern-
ment documents, and historical archives to construct a comprehensive dataset of American mayoral
candidates, with details about race, ethnicity, and gender, as well as political and occupational ex-
perience. This original dataset includes more than 3,200 mayoral candidates from 248 U.S. cities
in 44 states and spans the time period 1950 to 2007. Drawing on these extensive data, I provide a
detailed account of descriptive representation in American cities. My data reveal that mayors, like
politicians at higher levels of government, are not very diverse—they are very likely to be white
and male, with prior political experience and white-collar careers. Business owners and executives
are especially well represented in American city halls, accounting for about 32% of the candidates
and mayors in my dataset.
Given the formidable role of business interests in canonical theories of urban politics, it might
not be particularly surprising to find that business owners and executives make up a plurality of
mayoral candidates. Business leaders were key advocates of the municipal reform movement,
which introduced the notion that city governments should be run like businesses (Karnig and Welch
1980; Bridges 1997). Moreover, scholarly accounts suggest that municipal reforms often empow-
ered business interests. Although the reform movement was partly a response to the excesses of
political machines, local businesses were often both influential supporters and beneficiaries of the
machine (Shefter 1976; Erie 1988). Business interests have more recently been described as key
players in a local growth machine (Logan and Molotch 1987) or partners in an informal governing
regime (Stone 1989). Business leaders have long been portrayed as potent actors pursuing distinct
policy agendas designed to promote economic growth. This emphasis on growth typically implies
strong preferences for low taxes and minimal redistribution combined with high-quality services
and amenities. Yet, despite the prominence of business interests in the study of urban politics, few
claims have been tested empirically.
After documenting who runs for office and who serves, I investigate why executive business
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experience is so common among mayors. Are business owners more likely to run for mayor?
Are they more likely to win? I consider why business executives might run for mayor and why
voters might select candidates with experience in business. Although business executives do not
seem to win elections at higher rates, I find some evidence to suggest that they may be more
likely to run for mayor in cities with reform institutions. To better understand how institutions may
interact with voters’ preferences, I employ a conjoint survey experiment to assess the effect of a key
reform institution—nonpartisan elections. This approach allows me to investigate how multiple
attributes, such as occupation, political experience, race, and gender influence voters’ choices with
and without party labels. When party affiliations are unknown, respondents perceive business
owners and executives as quite likely, compared to candidates with other backgrounds, to produce
more conservative public policy. This result perhaps helps to explain why, in the absence of party
labels, Republican respondents do—and Democratic respondents do not—prefer candidates with
experience as a business owner or executive.
Notably, survey respondents’ evaluations of business owners are similar to those outlined in
influential theories of urban politics. Both generally anticipate that mayors with business back-
grounds will keep taxes low, maintain essential services, and promote growth. Do business exec-
utive mayors live up to these expectations? Assessing the impact of business executives on public
policy presents considerable methodological challenges. Mayors are not randomly assigned to
cities, and the factors that determine the type of mayor a city elects also may be related to policy
outcomes. Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to mitigate the threat of endogeneity, I
find that business executive mayors do shape city spending priorities. Electing a business owner or
executive leads to significantly lower levels of spending on redistributive programs and greater in-
vestment in infrastructure. Some suggestive evidence also indicates that they may increase revenue
from local sources, but likely in the form of user fees and charges rather than taxes.
In this dissertation, I draw on an original dataset of mayoral candidates to provide fresh insight
on representation in American cities. These comprehensive data document a stunning lack of
diversity among mayoral candidates, at the same time revealing the overrepresentation of business
owners and executives in city halls across the United States. I present findings which suggest
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
that business owners and executives may be more likely to run for mayor in cities with reform
institutions. Perhaps most importantly, however, I empirically evaluate the causal effect of electing
a business executive mayor. My findings suggest that business executives preside over policy
changes with implications for the distribution of both the costs and benefits of local government.
1.2 Chapter Summaries
1.2.1 Descriptive Representation in U.S. Cities
In Chapter 2, I examine descriptive representation in U.S. cities. Drawing on an original dataset
that includes gender, race, occupational background, and political experience for more than 3,200
mayoral candidates, I provide a comprehensive account of who runs for mayor and who serves.
Covering 248 cities and more than 50 years, these data indicate that like politicians at higher levels
of government, mayors tend to be white and male with prior political experience and white-collar
careers. Business owners and executives are especially well represented, accounting for about 32%
of the candidates in the sample.
Despite their numbers, I find little evidence to suggest that business owners and executives
win at higher rates than other candidates. However, business owners and executives make up a
larger share of mayoral candidates in cities with reform institutions. In particular, candidates in
council-manager cities are systematically more likely to have a background as a business owner or
executive than candidates from cities with a mayor-council government.
1.2.2 Candidate Choice without Party Labels
Chapter 3 investigates how nonpartisan elections may affect voters’ choices at the ballot box.
Nonpartisan elections are a defining feature of local elections in the United States. In the absence
of party labels, voters must use other information to determine whom to support. The institution of
nonpartisan elections, therefore, may impact voter choice by increasing the weight that voters place
on candidate dimensions other than partisanship. We hypothesize that in nonpartisan elections,
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voters will exhibit a stronger preference for candidates with greater career and political experience,
as well as candidates who can successfully signal partisan or ideological affiliation without directly
using labels.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted conjoint survey experiments on both nationally repre-
sentative and convenience samples that vary the presence or absence of partisan information. The
primary result of these experiments indicates that when voters cannot rely on party labels, they give
greater weight to candidate experience. We find that this process unfolds differently for respon-
dents of different partisan affiliations: Republicans respond to the removal of partisan information
by giving greater weight to job experience while Democrats respond by giving greater weight to
political experience.
1.2.3 The Business of Being Mayor
From mundane tasks like plowing snow and picking up garbage to preventing crime and fighting
fires, city governments provide essential services that are central to the public’s safety and quality
of life. As a city’s chief executive, the mayor is the highest profile local politician, but can mayors
influence policy choices and outcomes? Although case studies of American cities often carve out
a prominent role for mayors, quantitative studies examining the effects of mayors on a range of
outcomes have yielded mixed results.
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between mayors and fiscal outcomes, focusing on mayors’
occupational experience. Specifically, do cities that elect mayors with executive business expe-
rience exhibit systematically different fiscal policy outcomes? To identify the effect of mayors’
backgrounds on fiscal outcomes, I draw on an original dataset containing information on the occu-
pational and political experience of more than 3,200 mayoral candidates and employ a regression
discontinuity design. I find that mayors with executive business experience do shape municipal
fiscal policy by shifting the allocation of expenditures across policy areas, cutting spending in
redistributive policy areas while increasing funding for infrastructure.
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Chapter 2
Descriptive Representation
“HELP WANTED: CEO for financially distressed 146 year-old limited partnership drowning
in long term debt and enough past due bills to choke a goat. Successful applicant will be
responsible for managing the needs, wants, safety and endless complaints of 74,000 customers
while juggling chronic deficits, anemic revenues, suffocating union contracts and crippling
legacy costs using a business model that hasn’t evolved since the advent of indoor plumbing.
ANNUAL SALARY: $50,000. Seriously. That is not a typo” (Kelly 2013).
—excerpt from op-ed in the Scranton Times-Tribune, January 13, 2013.
2.1 Introduction
As the end of his third term approached, Scranton (PA) mayor, Chris Doherty, announced he would
not seek a fourth term. In his comments, Mayor Doherty emphasized his major accomplishments,
namely the revitalization of the city’s parks and downtown and a reduction in crime (Krawcze-
niuk 2013). However, local media coverage also included speculation that failed policy initiatives
to control spending precipitated property tax increases which undermined the mayor’s reelection
prospects. Days after the mayor’s announcement, the Scranton Times-Tribune published an op-ed
advocating higher pay for the mayor, reasoning that in light of the demands and challenges of the
job, the best option for attracting a qualified, capable candidate was to offer a higher salary and
the potential for performance bonuses (Kelly 2013). The op-ed included a mock-up of a classified
advertisement for the position of mayor (quoted above) that captures the challenges facing mayors
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across the country, and as a former city council member and a partner in a marketing firm, Doherty
has quite a bit in common with mayors from cities across the US and over time.
Perhaps it should not be surprising to find business owners and executives serving it city hall,
especially given the significant role of business interests in canonical theories of urban politics.
Dating back to early sociological studies such as Floyd Hunter’s Community Power Structure
(1963), business leaders and business interests are often depicted as potent influences in local
politics. Indeed, business leaders are at the center of Floyd’s elite theory. With a strong emphasis
on promoting growth and economic development, the theory of the city as a “growth machine”
casts business interests as the dominant force in local politics even when they operate behind the
scenes (Logan and Molotch 1987). An alternative perspective portrays business leaders as senior
partners in a durable governing coalition. Within the framework of Stone’s (1989) regime theory,
business leaders have significant political power but not unchecked influence. Business leaders
were key advocates of the reform movement and in some cities emerged as dominant political ac-
tors post-reform (Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Bridges 1997). Yet, local business interests were were
also both supporters and beneficiaries of the political machines the reformers sought to undermine
(Shefter 1976; Erie 1988). However, the notion that business leaders and interests are preeminent
forces in local politics has not gone unchallenged (cf. Dahl 2005).
Despite the prominent role of business interests in the study of urban politics, many claims
have not been rigorously tested. Few, if any, empirical studies have examined the role of business
owners and executives as politicians. Are business leaders overrepresented in city politics? Are
business owners and executives more likely to preside over cities with reform insitutions? Although
rich case studies have provided invaluable insights on mayors and their influence (see e.g., Ferman
1985; Stone 1989; DeLeon 1995; Fuchs 1992), we know relatively little about who runs for mayor
and who serves as mayor in cities across the United States. At the same time, considerable evidence
from a variety of political contexts suggests that who serves in office can influence public policy
(e.g., Whitby 1997; Besley and Case 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Carnes 2013). This
paper investigates descriptive representation in American cities, providing new details on who
serves as mayor as well as a glimpse of the role of business leaders in local politics. Perhaps
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not surprisingly, business owners and executives are especially well represented in American city
halls. But, conditional on running for office, are business leaders more likely to win?
When business owners and executives run for public office they often campaign on promises
to make government more efficient and business-like while at the same time drawing on insights
from business to promote economic growth. Today’s campaign rhetoric about applying business
principles to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of government is virtually interchangeable
with the claims that municipal reformers made more than 100 years ago. Progressive-era reformers
advocated a set of municipal institutions aimed at removing politics from local government. They
argued that municipal government’s key purpose was to provide essential services, which required
technical and management expertise rather than political skills or partisan loyalty. This empha-
sis on efficiency was, in part, a response to the corruption and excesses associated with political
machines. Reformers advocated fundamental changes in local government institutions, including
adoption of commission and council-manager forms of government with mayors selected from
and by a city council elected at-large via nonpartisan ballots in off-cycle elections. The reform
movement had a lasting impact on municipal governments in the United States. Indeed, city man-
agers and off-cycle elections are common in cities across the country, and nonpartisan ballots are
a defining feature of local elections.
Despite reformers’ emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness, their overarching goal seemed to
be reshaping representation at the local level—in particular, whose interests were represented. One
strategy was using electoral rules to limit participation in local politics to undermine the electoral
prospects of minorities and the working class (Bridges 1997; Welch and Bledsoe 1988). Reform
institutions, such as nonpartisan ballots and at-large elections were also expected to weaken the
links between elected officials and constituents, as each council member represents the entire city
rather than a district or ward and no party infrastructure exists to connect voters and politicians.
Although these institutions were ostensibly designed to serve the common good and to prevent
waste and corruption, reformers also hoped to curtail the influence of minority and working class
voters and limit the scope of local government with an eye toward promoting growth and avoiding
redistribution (Bridges 1997).
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Cities’ constraints and exposure to external economic forces are well documented in the urban
politics literature, but important questions remain about who governs American cities, how voters
choose local leaders, and whether the mayors voters elect affect outcomes. In this paper, I focus
on who serves as mayor. Using an original dataset of candidate backgrounds, I provide an account
of descriptive representation in American cities, covering 248 cities and more than 50 years. My
data reveal that U.S. mayors are not very diverse. The vast majority are white and male with white-
collar occupations and prior political experience. Business owners and executives are especially
well represented, accounting for about 32% of the candidates in the sample. Despite their numbers,
I find little evidence to suggest that business owners and executives win at higher rates than other
candidates. However, business owners and executives make up a larger share of mayoral candidates
in cities with reform institutions. In particular, candidates in council-manager cities are more
likely to have a background as a business owner or executive than cities with a mayor-council
government.
2.2 Why So Many Business Executive Mayors?
When business executives run for office, they tend to emphasize their leadership experience, busi-
ness knowledge, and management skills. Yet, recent talk of improving the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of government echoes the arguments of municipal Reformers of the past. Explaining how
he was elected as a Republican mayor in a Democratic city, former New York mayor Michael
Bloomberg invoked Fiorello La Guardia’s famous declaration that there is no Democratic or Re-
publican way to pick up garbage (Tholl 2014). “People care about services, not ideologies... There
are virtually no Republicans in New York City and yet I won because people care about services”
(quoted in Tholl 2014). The relevance and value of business experience comes up in mayoral
elections over time and across American cities. Examples abound, from Quincy, Massachusetts to
Waukesha, Wisconsin and from Dallas, Texas to San Diego, California.1
1Specific examples cited here include Francis X. McCauley mayor of Quincy, Massachusetts from 1982 to 1989
(Boston Globe November 1, 1981); Robert J. Foley, Sr., unsuccessful candidate in Waukesha, WI (Milwaukee Journal
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Although business executive candidates often cite their leadership experience, more specific
claims about the value and relevance of business experience tend to revolve around efficiency,
effectiveness, and accountability on one hand and stimulating local economic activity on the other.
Candidate Robert J. Foley’s comments in a 1994 mayoral debate in Waukesha, Wisconsin nicely
sum up the former:
“Greater accountability is called for. We need to increase efficiency. We need to force govern-
ment to adjust to the concept of saying that this is what we have to spend... as opposed to this
is what we want and let’s go get it to spend.” (quoted in Milwaukee Journal March 30, 1994).
Foley also referenced his “orientation to marketing,” citing the need to market the city, and his
“ability to motivate and lead” (Milwaukee Journal March 30, 1994). Wesley Hammonds, candidate
for mayor of Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1963 promised to lower taxes for homeowners, attract new
businesses, and reduce costs by increasing efficiency (The Corpus Christi Caller-Times April 1,
1963). Such examples depict candidates making the case that their business experience affords
them skills and knowledge that equip them to competently lead a city.
When voters select a mayor, they may be looking for a candidate who will address issues they
find important—perhaps improving city services, promoting economic growth, or lowering taxes.
Learning about the details of municipal finances or local public policy, however, would be complex
and time consuming. Instead, voters likely use a variety of information shortcuts to guide their
choices at the ballot box (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994). A candidate’s political party
affiliation tends to be the most most influential heuristic (Rahn 1993), but other characteristics,
such as a candidate’s race, gender, or social class, may also impact voters’ evaluations (Brady and
Sniderman 1985; McDermott 1998; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Carnes and Sadin 2015).
Political and occupational experience may be especially salient to voters at the local level where
a predominant shortcut, party label, may be either unavailable or less informative (McDermott
2005). A candidate’s prior political experience and occupation also tend to be readily available
not only in media coverage and campaign materials but also on the ballot in some cities. Notably,
March 30, 1994); Fred Meyer, unsuccessful candidate in Dallas, Texas (Boston Globe May 5, 1987); Bill Cleator,
unsuccessful candidate in San Diego, California (Los Angeles Times May 18, 1986).
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the majority of local elections are nonpartisan, and local issues may be less clearly associated with
partisan or ideological positions. Oliver, Ha and Callen (2012) suggest that in small cities, as long
as elected officials maintain an existing balance of services and taxes, voters are likely to retain in-
cumbents. On the other hand, Kaufmann (2004) focuses on how elections in large cities differ from
state or national elections, notably in the diminished salience of partisan identification. Instead,
voters may rely on the heuristic of racial or ethnic group identity, particularly under conditions of
heightened group conflict. Attributes such as race, ethnicity, and gender, in addition to candidates’
occupational backgrounds and political experience may be even more influential in nonpartisan
elections (Pomper 1966; Citrin, Green and Sears 1990; McDermott 1998, 2005; Schaffner, Streb
and Wright 2001).
Adopting a principal-agent framework, Fearon (1999) makes a strong theoretical case that
elections primarily serve as selection mechanisms rather than accountability mechanisms (see also
Besley 2006). Voters lack the time and knowledge to adequately monitor elected officials. Policy
considerations may be technical and complex, information may not be readily available, and voters
have only a blunt tool for sanctioning. In light of the obstacles and costs associated with monitor-
ing, “it might be entirely reasonable to imagine that the best available solution is to try to elect good
types of candidates” (Fearon 1999, 69). But, how do voters determine which candidates are “good
types?” For incumbents, retrospective evaluations provide at least a noisy measure of quality, but
voters also might make inferences from a variety of candidate attributes, such as appearance and
demeanor or education and job experience.
If voters are trying to select “good types,” surely they require information to infer the relative
quality of candidates for election. To evaluate incumbents, voters can use a variety of information
shortcuts to judge quality or competence, but what other cues might voters use to gauge the qual-
ity of candidates? For many years, scholars of American politics have used prior office holding
experience as a measure of quality (see e.g., Jacobson and Kernell 1983). Prior political expe-
rience may signal electability, policy expertise, or competence. To assess the role of incumbent
quality in elections for the US House of Representatives, Mondak (1995) develops measures of
incumbent competence and integrity, as well as a measure of overall quality that combines the two.
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Besley (2005) similarly suggests quality generally is composed of two dimensions, competence
and integrity.
Despite the significance of incumbency, other details of candidates’ prior experience may pro-
vide informative cues about candidate quality, and some evidence suggests voters may use can-
didates’ occupations to make inferences about ideology or issue positions. For example, Sadin
(2014) uses occupation as a proxy for social class and finds a positive relationship between an
upper class occupation and perceptions of competence. At the same time, however, respondents in
her survey experiment also differentiated between occupations, anticipating that a candidate who
works as an investment banker would be more conservative on economic issues than a candidate
employed as a cardiologist. The findings of a recent conjoint survey experiment examining the im-
pact of nonpartisan ballots suggest that Democrats and Respondents may rely on different shortcuts
in the absence of party labels (Kirkland and Coppock 2017). For Democratic respondents, prior po-
litical experience had the largest effect on vote choice while Republican respondents’ preferences
were more heavily influenced by candidates’ occupations. Perhaps not surprisingly, Repbulicans
did (and Democrats did not) prefer candidates described as business owners and executives, and
this difference is most pronounced in nonpartisan contests.
Are business executives and owners so well represented because their occupation marks them
as high quality candidates? If so, we should expect business owners and executives to win elections
at higher rates than other candidates. At the same time, nonpartisan elections could complicate this
relationship if voters’ evaluations of business executive candidates vary with their partisanship. It
may also be that voters see prior political experience, especially incumbency, as the clearest signal
of a candidate’s quality and competence.2 These possibilities lead to two related hypotheses. First,
I hypothesize that business owners and executives will win more often, on average, than mayoral
candidates with other types of occupational backgrounds. Second, I test the hypothesis that, as we
would expect, candidates with prior political experience fare better in elections for mayor.
2Several studies have found evidence of an incumbency advantage at the local level. For example, Trounstine
(2011) analyzes the incumbency advantage in city council elections, and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009, 2014) focus on
mayoral elections.
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It is possible that an outsize share of business executive mayors reflects voters’ preferences—or
the interaction of voters’ preferences and electoral institutions, but business owners and executives
may have a number of motivations for seeking local public office. Typical local policy domains,
such as zoning, land use, and development are of particular interest to those who own or operate
businesses within the city. Local tax policies, services, and amenities can directly shape the climate
for commerce in a city, and to the extent that these features attract or repel affluent taxpayers
and business activity, they may also contribute indirectly to the cost of doing business (Peterson
1981; Logan and Molotch 1987). Indeed, Peterson (1981) argues that competition for high income
taxpayers and businesses creates informal but powerful constraints on cities and informs a unitary
city interest in promoting economic vitality. Logan and Molotch (1987) go further, describing the
city as a “growth machine” where economic growth and value-free development are preeminent
goals, regardless of the potential ramifications for citizens and the environment. In this account,
“[t]he people who use their time and money to participate in local affairs are the ones who—in
vast disproportion to their representation in the population—have the most to gain or lose in land-
use decisions” (Logan and Molotch 1987, p. 62). Local business people are key players in local
politics, working to shape the agenda and policy to their benefit whether or not they hold elected
office.
In theorizing the city as a growth machine, Logan and Molotch (1987) portray business lead-
ers and business interests as dominant and exclusively (or very nearly so) self-interested political
actors. However, Stone (1989) offers a more nuanced view in his regime theory. Recognizing the
formal and informal constraints on local governments, Stone suggests that local political actors can
expand governing capacity by building governing regimes that include elected officials, as well as
business and civic leaders. These are informal but durable coalitions that bring together actors
with an array of resources working to shape the local policy agenda and achieve mutually bene-
ficial policy goals. With a variety of resources and strong preferences over local policy, business
owners and executives tend to take on prominent roles in the regime, but they also may need to
compromise with other members of the coalition. In his study of Atlanta, Stone (1989) portrays
the business community as powerful but not necessarily dominant, and he notes an element of civic
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mindedness in addition to self interest.
The centrality of business interests in theories of urban politics suggests that we should not be
especially surprised to observe a large number of business owners and executives serving in local
elected offices. Admittedly, many of these accounts also carve out a substantial role for informal
influence by actors who operate outside the official channels of city hall. It is not clear exactly
how we could empirically test for these relationships. However, I do test a third hypothesis that
business owners and executives will make up an outsize share of candidates for mayor.
Although much of the rhetoric of municipal reform addressed the corruption and waste typ-
ically associated with machine politics, reformers sought to fundamentally alter politics to limit
representation and circumscribe government activity (see e.g., Bridges 1997; Welch and Bledsoe
1988). Amy Bridges (1997) argues that reformers wanted to weaken the linkages between politi-
cians and their constituents, but she also notes that there was also a debate about the role of govern-
ment that “often resembled the argument between New Deal Democrats and Hoover Republicans,
the former arguing government should do more and the later arguing it should do less” (p. 23). In
particular, reformers sought to curtail the infuence of poor, working-class, and minority voters to
create a more homogeneous white, middle-class electorate with little appetite for redistribution. To
accomplish these goals, reformers worked to change the rules of the game by altering municipal
institutions. The indirect election of mayors, the council-manager form, nonpartisan ballots, at-
large elections, and off-cycle elections were all designed to dampen participation and the influence
of nonwhite and working class voters. There is evidence to suggest that these municipal reforms
did alter representation in cities that adopted them (for a review, see Welch and Bledsoe 1988).
In some cities, businesspeople seemed to replace the machine as the dominant force in local poli-
tics, and on average, nonpartisan and at-large elections seem to produce less diverse city councils
(Welch and Bledsoe 1988).
While electoral institutions may create favorable prospects for business executive candidates,
the council-manager form of government also may advantage business owners and executives.
When a city manager handles day-to-day government administration, the mayoralty may be a part-
time job with low pay. Prior studies of state legislatures have argued that citizen legislatures also
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may attract more affluent and more Republican candidates because they may be better positioned
to take on a job as a part-time legislator (Fiorina 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2002). One element of the
rationale is that affluent business owners can often make their own schedules and can afford to
spend part of their time serving in the legislature, but their work is too lucrative to consider serving
as a full-time legislator. For less well off candidates, the calculus is essentially reversed. Similarly,
business owners and executives may be uniquely positioned to serve as mayor in council-manager
cities because they are more likely to have the resources and flexibility to take time out of their
schedule to handle city business. In contrast, candidates with other occupations may have struc-
tured schedules and be unable to take on the demands of the office—especially for little compen-
sation.
Do reform institutions advantage business owners and executives in local electoral politics? All
directly elected mayors are elected in citywide elections, and there is mixed evidence on the effect
of nonpartisan elections. Notably, many cities have a bundle of reform institutions as well as the
council-manager form of government. In cities with a professional city manager, the mayoralty
may be especially attractive to business owners and executives. This notion leads to a fourth
hypothesis suggesting that business owners and executives are even more likely to run for mayor
in cities with reform institutions, particularly cities with the council-manager form of government.
2.3 Data: Candidates, Cities, and Institutions
Data constraints present a central challenge in documenting who seeks and wins the office of
mayor. Earlier studies have chronicled some mayoral characteristics, such as race, gender, and
party affiliation (e.g., Karnig and Welch 1980; Pelissero, Holian and Tomaka 2000; Ferreira
and Gyourko 2009, 2014; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Hopkins and McCabe 2012; de Benedictis-
Kessner and Warshaw 2016), but the existing data has been limited in two key ways. First, some
studies and surveys cover only mayors, excluding other candidates. Second, datasets that include
more detailed information about mayors or candidates often include only a small sample of cities
and cover a relatively short time period. Notable exceptions include recent efforts to build large
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datasets of mayoral elections that include multiple candidates for large numbers of cities and cover
most of the post-WWII time period (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009, 2014; Gerber and Hopkins 2011;
de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016). Although these datasets represent a significant ad-
vance, they still provide only limited information about candidates—name, party affiliation, and
incumbency status.
To provide a richer, more comprehensive account of representation in American cities, I com-
piled an original dataset of mayoral candidate backgrounds. Working from an existing dataset
of U.S. mayoral elections, I researched the top two mayoral candidates in each election, build-
ing detailed candidate profiles.3 Relying on a variety of sources, including government records,
contemporaneous news stories, historical archives, and obituaries, I collected information about
candidates, including age, race, gender, occupational background, and political experience. I focus
on a sample of cities with a population of 50,000 or greater as of the 2000 U.S. Census. The cities
in the sample vary quite a bit in terms of population, geographic region, and political institutions
but are, on average, quite similar to the universe of U.S. cities with populations of at least 50,000.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for cities in the sample as well as all U.S. cities of at least
50,000 residents as of the 2000 U.S. Census. Although the mean population is higher for cities
in the sample, on other demographic and socioeconomic measures, including median household
income, home ownership rate, and home values, the sample closely resembles the universe of cities
of 50,000 or more.
The candidate backgrounds dataset includes race, gender, political experience, and occupa-
tional backgrounds for a total of 3,257 candidates.4 Because some candidates’ background infor-
mation is missing or incomplete, I focus on the subset of data that covers elections with complete
information for the top two candidates. The resulting dataset includes 2,434 candidates (1,217
3Election data were provided by Fernando Ferreira and Joseph Gyourko, who collected the data via a survey of
U.S. cities and townships with a population of at least 25,000 people as of the 2000 U.S. Census. These data are used
in Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), which includes a detailed description of the data and collection process, and Ferreira
and Gyourko (2014).
4This paper relies on data collected through December 31, 2016, but data collection is ongoing.
CHAPTER 2. DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION 19
Table 2.1: Sample of Cities
Cities with > 50,000 Current Sample—
Population Mayors Data
Number of cities 603 248
Population 165,885 217,305
(410,156) (585,338)




Median HH income $43,667 $43,727
(13,658) (13,584)
Home ownership 58.45% 58.44%
(12.47) (11.46)
Median house value $143,319 $142,023
(87,568) (78,348)
Note: From 2000 U.S. Census, mean values with standard deviations in parentheses.
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elections) from 248 U.S. cities across 44 states and covers the time period of 1950 to 2007. From
the raw data, I coded candidates’ occupational backgrounds and political experience. Indicators
of political experience include incumbency and prior experience as mayor, city council member,
county legislator, state legislator, and member of Congress. I recorded a primary occupation for
each candidate, as well as an occupational category. These categories include business owner or
executive, non-executive business occupations, other white-collar occupations (e.g., educators and
healthcare professionals), public sector employment, and blue-collar occupations. I also noted
candidates employed in specific sectors, such as real estate and development or banking and in-
vestments.
To examine these candidates in the context of local politics, I compiled data on local govern-
ment institutions as well as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of their home cities.
Information about cities’ populations and their characteristics come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
These data include measures of population, racial diversity, median household income, and home
ownership rates.5 Details about the form and institutions of local governments come from the
International City/County Management Association (ICMA). The ICMA routinely surveys munic-
ipalities to determine form of government, electoral rules, city council size, and mayors’ formal
powers. Data are available in electronic format for surveys conducted at five year intervals be-
tween 1981 and 2006. To cover earlier years, I collected similar data available in printed volumes
of The Municipal Year Book published by the ICMA.6 Unfortunately, there is some variation in the
variables measured by ICMA over the years, but key features of municipal governing institutions,
such as form of government, use of nonpartisan or partisan ballots, the size of the city council, and
5For intercensal years, I use linear interpolation to estimate missing values (see Weden et al. (2015) for a discussion
of the use and performance of linear interpolation of U.S. Census data).
6I accessed details about municipal government form and institutions from The Municipal Year Book: An Author-
itative Resume of Activities and Statistical Data of American Cities for every fifth year from 1951 to 1976, with the
exception of The Municipal Year Book 1971, which did not include the relevant information. For intervening years,
I interpolate values from the most recent year in which the data were observed. Although cities do occasionally al-
ter their governing institutions, changes are rare. Indeed, the ICMA data show evidence of changes in the form of
government in only 12 cities (less than 5% of the sample) over nearly 60 years.
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whether its members are elected by districts or at large, are consistently observed over time.
2.4 Who Runs for Mayor? Who Serves?
The candidate background data indicate that mayors, like elected officials at higher levels of gov-
ernment, are not an especially diverse group. The vast majority are white and male with white-
collar occupations and prior political experience. Table 2.2 provides details on the race, ethnicity,
and gender of candidates. Strikingly, over 91% of mayors are white, 89% are male, and about 82%
are both white and male. Approximately 5.5% of mayors are African American, while about 2.5%
are Latino and less than 1% are Asian. It seems important to note that these data cover more than
50 years. Women and nonwhite candidates gain greater representation over time, but the disparities
remain quite profound—even in the 2000s, 65% of mayors are white and male. Table 2.2 shows
that representation along race and gender lines is quite similar for winning candidates and runners-
up. I use χ2 tests to formally evaluate the differences in the distributions of winning and losing
candidates. For both race and gender, the resulting test statistics provide little reason to think the
small differences are systematic (for race, χ2 = 0.28 and p = 0.964; for gender, χ2 = 0.004 and p
= 0.948). These results, however, do not necessarily imply that these traits are insignificant. For
example, I cannot account for candidates’ strategic decisions to run for office. Women or nonwhite
candidates may not run if they believe the probability of winning is low (Kanthak and Woon 2015).
Moving on to examine candidates’ occupational backgrounds (presented in Table 2.3), we see
more diversity, although mayors tend to have white-collar backgrounds. As anticipated, business
owners and executives are very well represented—about 32% of mayors. By way of comparison,
31% of the Members of Congress who served during the 106th to 110th Congresses had experience
as a business owner or executive (per CLASS Dataset, Carnes 2016). Data for other offices tend
to be quite sparse, but the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has collected infor-
mation about state legislators’ occupations sporadically. These data indicate that anywhere from
about 16% (1993) to just over 21% (1976) of state legislators are business owners or executives.7
7National Conference of State Legislatures (N.d.) posts data on state legislators’ occupations only for the follow-
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Table 2.2: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
Winners Runners-up
Race & Ethnicity
White 1110 91.2% 1117 91.8%
Black 67 5.5% 63 5.2%
Latino 32 2.6% 30 2.5%
Asian 8 0.7% 7 0.6%
n = 2434, χ2 = 0.28, p = 0.964
Gender
Men 1088 89.4% 1086 89.2%
Women 129 10.6% 131 10.8%
n = 2434, χ2 < 0.01, p = 0.948
Among mayors, business owners and executives do comprise the largest occupational group. At-
torneys comprise another 20% of mayors, public employees make up nearly 8%, and about 6.2%
of mayors are managers or supervisors, while sales professionals and educators each account for
about 5% of mayors. Although business owners and executives are the largest single occupational
group, they do not appear to win at higher rates—in fact, business executives make up a slightly
larger share of losing candidates. For the most part, differences in the distribution of winners and
runners-up by occupation appear to be negligible, and I cannot rule out the possibility that these
differences are due to chance (χ2 = 8.93 and p = 0.444).
In sharp contrast to the analyses of candidates’ race, gender, and occupation, it appears that
mayors and runners-up do differ in terms of political experience. Table 2.4 describes the prior
political experience of mayoral candidates, and the differences between those who win election
ing years: 1976, 1986, 1993, 1995, 2007.
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Table 2.3: Occupational Backgrounds
Winners Runners-up
Occupational Experience
Business owner/executive 386 31.7% 397 32.6%
Attorney 240 19.7% 203 16.7%
Other occupations 214 17.6% 240 19.7%
Public Employee 96 7.9% 114 9.4%
Manager/supervisor 75 6.2% 70 5.8%
Sales 69 5.7% 61 5.0%
Educator 66 5.4% 55 4.5%
Other professional 33 2.7% 38 3.1%
Healthcare professional 20 1.6% 24 2.0%
Homemaker 18 1.5% 15 1.2%
n = 2434, χ2 = 8.93, p = 0.444
and those who lose seem quite stark. Overall, 79% of winning candidates have previously served
in elected office as compared to only 64% of runners-up. The data indicate that incumbents and
other candidates who have served as mayor, in particular, win at much higher rates than those who
lack prior mayoral experience. Just over 45% of winning candidates ran as incumbents, compared
to about 20% of losing candidates. The gap is slightly narrower among all candidates with prior
mayoral experience (including incumbents), but nearly 50% of winning candidates have already
served as mayor. Here, I find evidence of a systematic difference in the distribution of political
experience among winning candidates and runners-up (χ2 = 162.17 and p < 0.001).8
These differences may reflect a variety of factors. Voters may simply prefer candidates with
previous political experience over inexperienced candidates. However, political experience might
8To conduct the χ2 test, I recode candidates’ experience into mutually exclusive categories.
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reflect other unobserved variables that translate into victory at the polls. It may be, for example,
that previous mayors are more likely to have well-funded campaigns. These results also may be
the result of a straightforward selection problem: weaker candidates may never have won election,
so could not have accumulated any political experience. Nonetheless, this analysis does yield
some evidence that mayoral candidates with political experience win elections at higher rates than
inexperienced candidates.
Table 2.4: Political Experience
Winners Runners-up
Political Experience
No Experience 250 20.5% 433 35.6%
City Council 638 52.4% 560 46.0%
Mayor 606 49.8% 322 26.5%
Incumbent 546 45.2% 239 19.9%
State Legislator 111 9.1% 83 6.8%
County Legislator 34 2.8% 37 3.0%
US Legislator 15 1.2% 9 0.7%
n = 2434, χ2 = 162.17, p < 0.001 (Recoded into mutually
exclusive categories to estimate χ2 test statistic)
2.4.1 Candidates and Form of Government
The initial analyses above document disparities in descriptive representation among American
mayors but provide little evidence that, on average, factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, or occu-
pation determine who wins mayoral elections. However, it is possible that the supply of candidates
differs on these dimensions depending on the form and institutions of municipal government. In
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this section, I investigate whether and how mayoral candidates vary with the structure of local gov-
ernment, making comparisons on the basis of form of government. The overwhelming majority
of cities with a council-manager government (96% per ICMA data) also have other reform institu-
tions such as nonpartisan elections, and the presence of a city manager or use of the commission
form implies a smaller executive role for mayors. Here, I find substantively and statistically signif-
icant differences in the attributes of candidates who run for mayor based on the form of municipal
government.
Table 2.5 provides details on candidates’ race, ethnicity, and gender, with candidates in mayor-
council cities reported in the first column, candidates from council-manager cities in the second,
and candidates from commission-led cities in the third column. In terms of race, about 91% of can-
didates in both mayor-council and council-manager cities are white, but over 95% of candidates in
cities with commission governments are white. It seems worth noting that the commission form is
relatively rare in the sample and more common during the earlier part of the time period—that is,
before federal courts forced some cities to abandon the commission form of government, finding it
violated the Voting Rights Act. Mayor-council cities have a larger share of African-American can-
didates, about 7%, compared to less than 5% in council-manager cities and commission cities, but
mayor-council cities also have a smaller share of Latino candidates (1.5%) and Asian candidates
(0.3%) than council-manager cities where nearly 4% of candidates are Latino and another 1% are
Asian. The gender gap also varies with form of government. Women make up only 7% of candi-
dates in cities with a mayor-council government but about 15% of candidates in council-manager
cities. These differences in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender are statistically significant (for race
and ethnicity, χ2 = 24.51 and p < 0.001; for gender, χ2 = 41.20 and p < 0.001).
Turning to occupational backgrounds, we also see noteworthy differences in candidates by form
of government. Table 2.6 presents details on candidates’ occupational backgrounds for each form
of government. While business owners and executives make up a considerable share of candidates
in both mayor-council and commission cities (about 29% each), business executives comprise
35% of the candidates in council-manager cities. In contrast, attorneys are much less common
in council-manager cities, accounting for about 13% of candidates compared to 22% in mayor-
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Table 2.5: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
Mayor-Council Council-Manager Commission
Race & Ethnicity
White 1006 91.6% 1072 90.5% 61 95.3%
Black 73 6.6% 54 4.6% 3 4.7%
Latino 16 1.5% 46 3.9% 0 0.0%
Asian 3 0.3% 12 1.0% 0 0.0%
n = 2434, χ2 = 24.51, p = 0.001∗
Gender
Men 1022 93.1% 1004 84.8% 60 93.8%
Women 76 6.9% 180 15.2% 4 6.2%
n = 2434, χ2 = 41.20, p < 0.001
∗ p-value simulated due to low cell counts
council cities. Public employees also make up a smaller share of candidates in council-manager
cities (7%) relative to mayor-council cities (11%). The disparities in other occupational categories
are much less pronounced, but overall, the differences in occupation by form of government are
statistically significant (χ2 = 76.98 and p < 0.001).
The types of political experience that mayoral candidates have also appears to vary with form
of government. A relatively small portion of candidates (about 27%) in both council-manager and
mayor-council cities have no prior experience, but the share of inexperienced candidates is quite
a bit larger (42%) in commission cities. On the other hand, incumbents make up a larger share of
candidates in mayor-council systems—nearly 35% compared to 30% in council-manager cities and
27% in cities with commission government. In council-manager cities, the majority of candidates
have served on the city council (58%), while only 42% of candidates in mayor-council cities have
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Table 2.6: Occupational Backgrounds
Mayor-Council Council-Manger Commission
Occupational Experience
Business owner/executive 319 29.1% 415 35.1% 19 29.7%
Attorney 245 22.3% 155 13.1% 16 25.0%
Public Employee 120 10.9% 79 6.7% 8 12.5%
Sales 56 5.1% 70 5.9% 1 1.6%
Manager/supervisor 59 5.4% 80 6.8% 1 1.6%
Educator 56 5.1% 65 5.5% 0 0.0%
Other professional 29 2.6% 33 2.8% 4 6.2%
Homemaker 13 1.2% 18 1.5% 2 3.1%
Healthcare professional 8 0.7% 30 2.5% 2 3.1%
Other occupations 193 17.6% 239 20.2% 11 17.2%
n = 2434, χ2 = 76.98, p < 0.001∗
∗ p-value simulated due to low cell counts
city council experience. Experience as a state legislator or county legislator, however, is more
common among candidates in cities with mayor-council government. Similar to the candidate
characteristics examined above, differences in political experience by form of government are
statistically significant (χ2 = 120.51 and p < 0.001).
The analyses above show that mayoral candidates vary systematically with municipal form of
government. These results are also consistent with the hypothesis that business owners and execu-
tives are more likely to run for mayor in council-manager cities, but these analyses cannot support
inferences about the causal role of municipal form of government. A variety of other factors
could determine who runs for mayor. For example, partisan elections are much more common in
mayor-council cities, and political party organizations may recruit candidates with different back-
grounds, providing crucial resources and support. Perhaps business owners and executives have
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Table 2.7: Political Experience
Mayor-Council Council-Manager Commission
Political Experience
No Experience 301 27.4% 327 27.6% 27 42.2%
City Council 460 41.9% 689 58.2% 18 28.1%
Mayor 450 41.0% 424 35.8% 21 32.8%
Incumbent 380 34.6% 359 30.3% 17 26.6%
State Legislator 142 12.9% 39 3.3% 10 15.6%
County Legislator 55 5.0% 14 1.2% 1 1.6%
US Legislator 21 1.9% 2 0.2% 0 0.0%
n = 2434, χ2 = 120.51, p < 0.001 (Recoded into mutually exclusive categories to estimate
χ2 test statistic)
more resources and stronger networks that make them more likely than other candidates to run
in nonpartisan cities. To address potential confounders, I take a closer look at the link between
business executive mayoral candidates and the council-manager form of government.
2.4.2 A Closer Look at Business Executive Candidates
The mayoral candidate background data reveal that business owners and executives are extraordi-
narily well represented among U.S. mayors. Candidates with executive business experience are
also more common in council-manager cities. Is there a systematic relationship between the form
of government and the likelihood that candidates have a background as a business owner or exec-
utive? To address this question, I specify a series of logistic regression models. In an effort to ac-
count for potential confounders, I present multiple specifications that include a variety of variables
that may influence whether or not a business executive candidate runs for office. The dependent
variable is an indicator for a business executive candidate, and the key explanatory variable is a
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dichotomous measure indicating whether a city has the council-manager form of government.9
To address concerns about potential confounding variables, I include measures of a variety of
city characteristics. As discussed above, business experience may be more salient in nonpartisan
elections, so I add an indicator for partisan elections. Demographic and socioeconomic charac-
teristics of cities may influence who runs for mayor for a variety of reasons. For example, these
factors may shape voters’ preferences over form of government, candidates, and public policy. I
add measures of population, racial diversity, median household income, median house value, and
home ownership rate. Finally, reform institutions have been more common in certain regions of
the U.S. (Bridges 1997), so I also include specifications with fixed effects for region.
Table 2.8 reports the results of a series of logistic regression models examining the link be-
tween business executive candidates and form of government. The first model includes only the
key explanatory variable, whether a city has a council-manager form of government, and shows a
positive and statistically significant relationship between the council-manager form and the likeli-
hood that a candidate is a business executive. The coefficient for council-manager form is 0.351,
which implies that the probability that a candidate has executive business experience is about 7.5
percentage points higher in coucil-manager cities compared to cities with other forms of govern-
ment. The second model adds an indicator for nonpartisan elections, but the coefficient of the
council-manager variable is quite similar (0.348). In addition to institutional variables, model 3
adds demographic variables, population and the share of the population that is white, as well as
fixed effects for region. The coefficient of the council-manager variable is a bit smaller (0.253) but
still statistically significant, indicating that the probability of observing a business executive candi-
date is about 5.5 percentage points higher in cities with the council-manager form. Finally, model
4 adds several variables that measure the socioeconomic characteristics of cities, including median
household income, house values, and home-ownership rate. These results again indicate that there
is a systematic, positive relationship between the form of government and the probability that a
candidate has executive business experience, and the coefficient on the key explanatory variable is
9Using an alternative measure of the dependent variable that indicates whether there is a business executive can-
didate in a given election yields substantively similar results.
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slightly larger (0.273).
Taken together these results provide additional evidence to suggest that candidates for mayor
in cities with the council-manager form of government are more likely to have an occupational
background as a business owner or executive. A candidate in a council-manager city is about 5.5
to 7.5 percentage points more likely to be a business executive than a candidate in a mayor-council
or commission city. This relationship is statistically significant across model specifications that
account for a variety of potential confounders.
Table 2.8: Business Executive Candidates & Form of Government
Dependent variable:
Business Executive Candidate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Council-manager form 0.351∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.089) (0.092) (0.118) (0.121)




Percent white 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Median household income 0.839∗∗∗
(0.287)




Constant −0.916∗∗∗ −0.913∗∗∗ 0.450 0.203
(0.065) (0.072) (0.777) (1.296)
Fixed effects NA NA Region Region
Observations 2,346 2,330 2,250 2,250
Log Likelihood −1,470.410 −1,461.361 −1,390.007 −1,381.442
Note: Logistic regression results. Two-tailed test. Population, median household income,
and median house value transformed to logs. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
CHAPTER 2. DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION 31
2.5 Discussion
A central line of inquiry in the study of urban politics has been the influence of business interests.
One key obstacle to rigorously assessing the role of business executives and owners has been a lack
of comprehensive data about local office holders. Relying on an original data set of mayoral candi-
date backgrounds, this paper provides a detailed picture of descriptive representation in American
cities. What emerges is a striking deficit of descriptive representation. Women and people of color
are vastly underrepresented, but business owners and executives are especially well represented,
accounting for about 32% of mayors.
Uncovering the factors that determine descriptive representation in American cities is a daunt-
ing task, but the analyses presented here do provide some preliminary evidence on two fronts. First,
I find little evidence to indicate that business executives, men, and white candidates win at higher
rates. Second, my analyses of the relationship between candidates’ characteristics and form of
government suggest that candidates vary systematically with municipal institutions. For example,
women and Hispanic politicians make up a larger share of mayoral candidates in council-manager
systems, while a larger share of candidates in mayor-council cities are African American. Notably,
business executive candidates are most common in council-manager cities, and the analyses above
suggest that mayoral candidates in council-manager cities are more likely to be business owners or
executives than candidates in cities with either mayor-council or commission government.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that business owners and executives are more
likely to run for office in council-manager cities, and they also fit with claims that reform institu-
tions will affect who serves in elected office. At the same time, however, we must be cautious in
interpreting these results especially in drawing conclusions about the causal effects of the council-
manager form. In Section 4.2, I account for several potential confounders, but a city’s form of
government is not randomly assigned, which raises the threat of endogeneity. One serious concern
is the potential for selection bias. Certain types of cities might select into the council-manager
form, and the factors that determine form of government may also influence the types of candi-
dates who run for office. A second worry is the threat of omitted variable bias. For example, factors
that shape candidates’ decisions to run for office are difficult, or perhaps impossible in some cases,
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to observe.
Despite these methodological concerns, the overrepresentation of business executives in local
politics warrants further exploration. Questions remain about why so many business executives
serve as mayor. Beyond understanding their numerical representation among American mayors,
a pressing question is whether and how business owners and executives influence public policy.
In a related study, I find that electing a business executive mayor does lead to changes in local
fiscal policy, as these cities decrease spending in redistibutive policy areas and increase spending
on infrastructure (Kirkland 2016). Do business executive mayors shape policy in other domains?
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Chapter 3
Candidate Choice without Party Labels
“But when we get right straight
down to. . . all the various
ramifications of the public service
for our own individual lives, what
difference does it make whether the
men who do the work are
Republicans or Democrats;
whether they are high tariff or low
tariff? We want the men who will
do the work well and honestly.”
— Major Henry T. Lee advocating
the adoption of nonpartisan
municipal elections to a meeting of
Good Government organizations,
Los Angeles, California, 1909
3.1 Introduction
At the turn of the 20th century, Progressives advanced a set of reforms designed to erode the
strength of parties and political machines in local politics (see e.g., Welch and Bledsoe 1988).1
1This chapter was co-authored by Alexander Coppock, Ph.D.. A version of this chapter, Kirkland and Coppock
(2017), has been accepted and is forthcoming in Political Behavior (DOI: 10.1007/s11109-017-9414-8).
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Along with the institutions of city manager and at-large elections, nonpartisan electoral rules were
a crucial component of the Progressives’ strategy. Reformers argued that the raison d’eˆtre of
municipal government is the provision of essential services, which requires technical expertise
rather than partisan fealty. Advocates of the reform movement espoused the benefits of business-
like efficiency and a universalist approach to governance in contrast to the waste, corruption, and
particularistic benefits associated with machine politics (Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Bridges 1997).
The movement was largely successful: the vast majority of municipal governments in the US still
feature such reform institutions (Moulder 2008).
Nonpartisan elections – among the most prevalent and durable of the Progressive-era municipal
reforms – operate on the logic that voters will choose different candidates depending on the pres-
ence or absence of partisan information.2 Advocates of this institutional reform clearly thought
that victorious candidates would not only be different, but be better along some dimension, be it
ideological leaning, fitness for the job, or some other dimension of quality. The first question we
seek to answer is, were the Progressive-era reformers correct? Do different types of candidates
win when party labels are removed? Secondly, how do winning candidates differ under the two
regimes? In the absence of party labels, do voters rely on identity politics, or do they give greater
weight to other aspects of candidate biography such as previous government or private sector ex-
perience?
Previous scholarship indicates that the answer to the first question is likely to be yes. Parti-
san ballots provide voters a powerful, low-cost information shortcut (Popkin 1991; Rahn 1993).
Knowing nothing more than party labels, voters can infer candidates’ ideology and issue positions
with some degree of certainty. Removing these labels may induce voters to rely on alternative
heuristics, such as race or ethnicity (Pomper 1966; Bullock 1984; Bullock III and Campbell 1984;
Squire and Smith 1988) to infer candidates’ partisanship or ideology. The institution of nonparti-
2Another critical feature of nonpartisan elections is that they may decrease the ability of political machines to
influence election outcomes (Bridges 1997). We will focus our attention here on the information channel by which
nonpartisan rules may affect outcomes, as the reforms occurred throughout the entire US, including municipalities that
did not experience machine politics.
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san elections may change the kinds of candidates who win election simply by altering the relative
cost and probative value of different heuristics.
Granting that nonpartisan elections do change who wins, what sorts of candidates are likely
to be advantaged by the absence of party cues? Nonpartisan ballots may induce voters to give
greater weight to other characteristics beyond partisanship and ideology such as markers of com-
petence or quality (Schaffner, Streb and Wright 2001; Lim and Snyder 2015). One important
dimension of candidate quality is political experience. Incumbents and prior office holders have
electoral advantages in partisan legislative elections at both the national and state levels (Jacob-
son and Kernell 1983; Jewell and Breaux 1988; Jacobson 1997; Lee 2008). Several studies find
that incumbency advantages extend further down ballot to mayors (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009,
2014) and city council members (Trounstine 2011). These studies indicate that voters may rely on
an incumbency heuristic when evaluating candidates; a remaining open question is whether this
reliance itself depends on electoral rules.
Studying the effects of nonpartisan elections is difficult for two main reasons. The first is
common to settings in which the researcher does not manipulate the causal variable of interest
directly. We cannot be sure whether the observed differences in election outcomes for partisan
and nonpartisan elections are due to the causal effect of the electoral institution itself or some
other feature of the electoral context. It may be that localities that opt to institute nonpartisan
elections place a higher value on leaders’ political experience than those with partisan elections
due to the tastes and preferences of the local electorate, not the electoral rules. Statistical fixes
for this problem such as multiple regression or matching only help if we are willing to assume
that after conditioning on a set of observable characteristics of elections, the electoral institution is
“as-if” randomly assigned. The plausibility of such an assumption varies from context to context.
Even in localities that hold nonpartisan mayoral elections but partisan congressional elections, one
may still be worried that the electoral rules are nonrandomly applied.
The second challenge is that elections that are nonpartisan in theory are not necessarily non-
partisan in practice (Adrian 1959). Candidates’ party affiliations may be widely known to voters
or revealed during the campaign. Even in nominally nonpartisan elections, partisanship remains a
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systematic predictor of voters’ preferences when information about candidates’ party or ideology
is readily available (Squire and Smith 1988; Schaffner, Streb and Wright 2001). It is not clear how
to measure and account for these complexities. For example, if we were to find that in nonpartisan
elections, experienced candidates are more likely to be elected, this result might actually reflect
the subtle dynamics of candidates’ decisions to compete in elections where candidates’ partisan-
ship is not advertised but nevertheless common knowledge. In such a scenario, liberal candidates
in conservative districts might be systematically less experienced because the high-quality, liberal
would-be candidates, knowing they have a poor chance of victory, pursue careers outside of politics
or run in other constituencies.
Our experimental design cleanly sidesteps both problems. In two separate implementations
of the same design, we invite subjects to participate in a series of “elections” that are conducted
as conjoint survey experiments. In each election, subjects see the profiles of two candidates and
must choose between them. Unlike standard conjoint experiments that only randomize the levels
of a fixed set of attributes, we randomize in addition whether the partisanship attribute itself is
shown to respondents. This design enables us to determine the effect of partisan information, not
just on candidate choice, but also on how subjects use the other attributes to evaluate candidates.
Unlike some nonpartisan elections outside the survey environment, our nonpartisan elections are
unambiguously devoid of partisan information.
Survey experiments are sometimes described as being high on internal validity but lower on
external validity (Mutz 2011). We are sympathetic to this critique and think it is important to
distinguish between two kinds of external validity. The first concerns the extent to which an ex-
periment conducted on one sample would generalize to the same experiment being conducted on
a different sample. We directly show that our experiment exhibits this kind of external validity
by conducting it on both Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and on a nationally representative sample
administered by YouGov.3 The second, and in our view more important, sort of external validity
concerns the extent to which the causal processes at work in the survey environment map on to the
3YouGov uses sample matching techniques to construct a nationally representative sample from their panel of
respondents. For more information about YouGov’s sampling procedures, see Vavreck and Rivers (2008).
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political phenomena we wish to investigate in the real world. Here we rely on an analogy between
the survey environment and the voting booth. Our survey respondents have to choose between two
hypothetical candidates on the basis of the five or six pieces of information we provide. Especially
for down-ballot offices, voters have to choose between two candidates on the basis of informa-
tion provided on the ballot itself. In addition to candidates’ names (from which gender, race, and
ethnicity can be imperfectly inferred (McDermott 2005)), some ballots provide incumbency, occu-
pation, or partisanship information. In this way, electoral choice is not so different from a survey
response. The survey experimental context is of course very different from voting – the stakes are
much lower and responding to survey questions is far less meaningful than casting ballots. In this
case, however, we are willing to trade a decrease in verisimilitude for an increase in our ability to
directly manipulate the information environment.
To preview our results, we see a clear difference across electoral institutions in how subjects
use information about candidate experience in both samples. In nonpartisan elections, we find that
the effect of candidate experience on vote choice is approximately 10 percentage points higher
than in partisan elections. We find that withholding partisan information has different effects for
different subjects. In particular, Republicans rely more on career experience whereas Democrats
turn to political experience when candidates’ partisanship is unknown.
3.2 Voting and Information Shortcuts
Since the early voting studies of the Columbia and Michigan schools, political scientists have con-
sistently documented uneven and generally low levels of political knowledge and interest among
voters (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli
Carpini and Keeter 1996). Although most voters tend to know very little about political candidates
and their policy positions, information shortcuts or heuristics can guide political decision-making
(e.g., Downs 1957; Popkin 1991). Indeed, some evidence suggests that heuristics can enable low-
information voters to make nearly the same choices they would make if they were fully informed
(Althaus 2003; Lupia 1994). Voters may rely on any number of shortcuts, including retrospective
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evaluations, endorsements, or candidates’ personal characteristics, but party identification tends to
be the most potent heuristic (Rahn 1993). Party identification is a “shortcut or default value, a
substitute for more complete information about parties and candidates” (Popkin 1991, p. 14). A
party label generally provides a reliable proxy for candidates’ ideology and issue positions. For
voters, party identification also appears to be a stable and enduring attachment, akin to other social
identities such as ethnicity, religion, or class (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler
2002).
Voters may evaluate candidates using a likability heuristic that relies on their affect toward
politically salient groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985). If voters use this information shortcut,
their perceptions of candidates’ ideological positions would reflect their own beliefs weighted
by their feelings toward opposing groups. For example, Brady and Sniderman (1985) find that
on average, conservative survey respondents dislike liberals more intensely than liberals dislike
conservatives, and they argue conservative respondents consequently overestimate the ideological
distance between the two groups. Another possibility is that voters rely on a representativeness or
goodness-of-fit heuristic by making inferences about candidates based on how well they represent
a given group or type (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Popkin 1991). Carnes and Sadin (2015), for
instance, argue that a representativeness heuristic leads subjects to mistakenly infer that candidates
from working class families are more liberal on economic policy than candidates from affluent
backgrounds.
Among studies of nonpartisan elections, a common finding is that voters rely on party cues
when they can and look to other information shortcuts, such as race or incumbency, when neces-
sary. Prior research suggests that characteristics such as race (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Mc-
Dermott 1998), gender (e.g., Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; McDermott 1998), and class (Sadin
2014) also influence perceptions of candidates. Women and African-American candidates are seen
as more liberal and more Democratic than white men (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; McDermott
1998). Using occupation as a proxy for social class in a survey experiment, Sadin (2014) finds
that respondents rate upper class candidates as more competent relative to either working class
candidates or candidates whose social class is unknown.
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3.3 Information Shortcuts in Nonpartisan Elections
Our expectation is that in nonpartisan elections voters will rely less heavily on partisan heuristics
to choose between candidates. The empirical record to date generally supports the expectation that
partisanship and vote choice should be less strongly associated in nonpartisan elections. For ex-
ample, Pomper (1966) analyzes ward-level election results in Newark, New Jersey and finds vote
shares for candidates of the same party are highly correlated in partisan state legislative elections
but not in nonpartisan municipal elections. In a recent study, Lim and Snyder (2015) find strong
correlations (0.88 to 0.99) between the Democratic vote share for state judges and the Demo-
cratic “normal vote” in partisan elections. A different pattern emerges in nonpartisan elections,
where judges’ vote shares are less strongly correlated with their co-partisans’. Schaffner, Streb
and Wright (2001) also find a systematic relationship between partisanship and Democratic vote
share in partisan contests, but partisanship is not a statistically significant predictor of the vote in
most of the nonpartisan elections they analyze.
Even when nonpartisan rules make candidates’ party affiliations difficult or costly to uncover,
some evidence suggests that voters may try to infer party from other information. In a study of non-
partisan judicial retention elections in California, Squire and Smith (1988) leverage a pre-election
survey that provided a random subset of respondents with the name of the governor who appointed
each judge. Treatment group respondents were more likely to support retaining judges appointed
by copartisan governors. Recent experimental evidence also indicates that voters may infer can-
didates’ party affiliations from issue positions. Bonneau and Cann (2015) provide descriptions
of hypothetical candidates for state supreme court, with a random subset of subjects receiving
party cues. Descriptions of the Republican candidate, for example, highlight support for the death
penalty and a commitment to traditional family values while Democrats are described as advocates
of same-sex marriage who believe the courts should take an active role in promoting equality. The
experimental results show a strong link between partisanship and vote choice even in the absence
of an explicit party cue.
Nonpartisan elections are not devoid of ideological or partisan content, but because voters do
not have access to the partisan shortcut, such information is relatively more costly to acquire. We
CHAPTER 3. CANDIDATE CHOICE WITHOUT PARTY LABELS 40
therefore predict that in nonpartisan elections, voters will be more likely to resort to other cues.
These cues may include indicators of fitness for the job, including private sector and political
experience (Schaffner, Streb and Wright 2001; Lim and Snyder 2015).
A first glance at this prediction comes from the historical record of 1,010 US mayoral elec-
tions held between 1950 and 2007. This dataset covers 225 unique municipalities and records
background characteristics of winners and runners-up, contextual information such as electoral
rules, and electoral outcomes. We constructed this dataset principally by examining the newspaper
accounts of candidates and electoral outcomes.4
Table 3.1 shows the political experience of the winning candidate in each election, subset ac-
cording to whether the election was nominally nonpartisan or partisan. The statistically significant
χ2 statistic indicates that the political experience of winning candidates differs across partisan and
nonpartisan elections. In partisan elections, 30% of winning candidates have no previous political
experience whereas in nonpartisan elections, the share of inexperienced winning candidates drops
by 9 percentage points to 21%. That fewer inexperienced candidates win in nonpartisan elections
fits with our predictions.
The 9 percentage point difference might reflect the effect of nonpartisan ballots on who gets
elected, but it could just as easily reflect other differences between cities that do and do not hold
partisan elections. For example, larger cities are more likely to hold partisan contests, and in
larger cities candidates, such as attorneys and business executives, with nonpolitical experience
may be more likely to run for election. Our own data bear this out. In partisan elections, 63% of
candidates are attorneys or business executives while in nonpartisan elections the corresponding
figure is 48%. Another potential confounder is that partisan organizations provide financial and
institutional support, creating opportunities for politically inexperienced candidates. Observational
analyses of the effects of election type are further complicated the concern mentioned above that
some elections are nonpartisan in name only.
While we do see that winners in nonpartisan elections appear to have more political experience
than winners in partisan elections, an alternative analysis of the historical record paints a murkier
4For a deep exploration of this dataset, please see [citation withheld].
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picture. Subsetting our dataset to only those elections in which candidates have different levels of
political experience (779 elections), we see that the candidate with more experience wins about
62% of the time in partisan elections and 61% of the time in nonpartisan elections. This difference
is not statistically significant (p = 0.791).
Table 3.1: Political Experience of Winning Candidate in Partisan and Nonpartisan US Mayoral
Elections.
Nonpartisan Partisan
N % N %
No previous political experience 163 21% 72 30%
City legislator 216 28% 39 16%
County legislator 13 2% 3 1%
State legislator 37 5% 18 8%
US legislator 5 1% 4 2%
Mayor 338 44% 102 43%
772 100% 238 100%
χ2 = 21.2, p < 0.001
3.4 Conjoint Candidate Choice Survey Experiments
In an effort to combat the challenges outlined above, we have adopted the conjoint survey design,
ideal for studying multidimensional preferences (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014).
Within political science, the conjoint design has been applied to the study of immigration pref-
erences (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2015), complex
policy preferences (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2015), and (as in our case) candidate pref-
erence (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014; Carlson 2015; Franchino and Zucchini 2015).
The conjoint design will also allow us to evaluate the separate impacts of a large set of causal
factors on subjects’ preferences over candidates. While these experiments are artificial in the sense
that they present subjects with an abstract choice, Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto (2015)
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show that conjoint experiments can produce externally valid estimates by comparing their experi-
mental results to real-world outcomes.
In our studies, subjects judge five successive elections in which five (or six) attributes of two
competing candidates are displayed: their race, gender, political experience, career experience,
age, and in some cases, political party. The attributes of each candidate are fully randomized
so that every possible candidate profile is equally likely. Figure 3.1 shows examples of both an
election in which partisan information is available (panel a) and an election in which it is withheld
(panel b). The possible levels of each attribute are displayed in Table 3.2. Some levels were added
to the Political Experience and Career Experience attributes in the YouGov version of the study in
order more fully account for the range of plausible biographies.
Figure 3.1: Experimental Stimuli
(a) A Partisan Election (b) A Nonpartisan Election
A great deal of the methodological literature on conjoint analysis is concerned with the selec-
tion of attributes and levels. Attributes should be independent of one another and levels should
describe a wide range of possibilities (Green and Srinivasan 1978). A recurring question is how
many attributes to include. The consensus seems to be that six or seven attributes is the limit.
Above this limit, survey researchers caution that subjects may resort to cognitive shortcuts when
evaluating profiles, causing two problems for inference. First, subjects may over-weight the first
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Table 3.2: Attributes
Race Political Experience Career Experience Gender Age Party***
White* None* Educator* Female* 35* Independent*
Hispanic School Board President** Stay-at-home Mom/Dad** Male 45 Democrat
Black City Council Member Small Business Owner 55 Republican
Asian State Legislator Police Officer 65




**: Level only shown in YouGov experiment.
***: Party only displayed in partisan elections.
few attributes presented to them. Second, they may over-weight particularly salient attributes. We
address the first problem by following the advice of Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014,
p. 7) to randomize the order of the attributes.
The second problem is, in our view, a feature, not a bug, of our design. Candidates’ party is
likely the most salient detail when subjects are choosing between profiles. By randomizing whether
or not subjects are shown the party label, we can directly test whether the injection of partisanship
into an election changes the impacts of the other attributes. Further, this design feature reflects the
real-world variation in electoral institutions and is therefore our main experimental manipulation.
Subjects
We conducted our experiment on a Mechanical Turk (MTurk) convenience sample and on a nation-
ally representative sample constructed by YouGov. The demographic profile of the MTurk sample
is quite different from that of the YouGov sample. On average, the MTurk sample is whiter, more
male, more liberal, more Democratic, better educated, and younger.5 In addition to these measured
characteristics, the samples may differ on unobserved dimensions. Indeed, many social scientists
5See the online appendix for descriptive statistics by sample.
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are skeptical of MTurk samples because of these unmeasured dimensions (Goodman, Cryder and
Cheema 2013). Others (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Mullinix et al. 2016) are optimistic that
experimental results on MTurk can generalize to other populations but stress the need for care-
ful consideration of the individual level moderators that might invalidate generalizing from one
context to another. In our case, we believe that the most important moderator is respondents’ par-
tisanship. Fortunately, MTurk offers sufficient numbers of both Democrats and Republicans to
obtain relatively precise estimates for each group, even if MTurk partisans are not representative
of partisans nationally.
We will limit our exploration of treatment effect heterogeneity to partisan differences only, for
two reasons. First, because we randomized whether or not candidates’ partisanship is displayed to
subjects, it is appropriate to test whether the effects of candidates’ partisanship are moderated
by subjects’ own party affiliation. Second, we are concerned about the multiple comparisons
complications we would encounter with additional subgroup analyses.
3.4.1 Analysis
Our main dependent variable is candidate choice, which is asked “Which of these two candidates
do you prefer?” A second dependent variable, candidate competence, is asked “On a scale from
0 to 100, how competent do you think these candidates would be as mayor?” We will use this
dependent variable to explore a possible mechanism by which candidate attributes and electoral
contexts affect vote choice.
We will analyze the effects of our experimental manipulations on these dependent variables
using two models, shown in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. The coefficient vectors β1, β2, ... and α1, α2...
are each of length k−1, where k refers to the total number of levels within an attribute. Individual-
level idiosyncrasies in candidate preferences are captured by the error terms  and η. The required
assumption that the errors are independent of each other and of candidate attributes is justified by
the experimental design. We will estimate Equation 3.1 among the subset of elections that do not
include party and Equation 3.2 among the elections that do include party.
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Y = β0 + β1Race+ β2Age+ β3Gender + β4Political Exp+ β5Career Exp+  (3.1)
Y = α0 + α1Race+ α2Age+ α3Gender + α4Political Exp+ α5Career Exp+ α6Party + η
(3.2)
Our experiment is motivated by the extent to which the party heuristic overwhelms the other
factors contributing to candidate choice. Accordingly, we are especially interested in the differ-
ences between β1, β2, ... and α1, α2.... We will estimate Equations 3.1 and 3.2 by ordinary least
squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered by respondent. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto
(2014, p. 15) show that this approach is asymptotically equivalent to their average marginal com-
ponent effect (AMCE) estimator.6 We will further condition the estimation on respondents’ own
party identification, focusing on effects among Democrats versus Republicans including leaners.
We will test for the equality of the corresponding coefficients in Equations 3.1 and 3.2 by
interacting the attributes with an indicator for election type in the full sample. We will test for
the equality of coefficients between the Democrats and Republicans by interacting the treatment
variables with an indicator for partisanship.
A short note on presentation: all together, these analyses will render a very large number of co-
efficient estimates. For this reason, we will present our results graphically using coefficient plots,
in which attribute levels are placed on the vertical axis and point estimates with 95% confidence
intervals are placed on the horizontal axis. For those who prefer tables, the corresponding regres-
sion output for each figure is presented in the appendix. We recognize that this presentation mode
obscures some details while highlighting others – we have endeavored to maintain both clarity and
transparency in our presentation choices.
6Indeed, when we analyze our MTurk experiment using their estimator, both our point estimates and standard
errors differ only in the third or fourth decimal place. The implementation of the AMCE estimator provided in the
cjoint package for R (Strezhnev et al. 2015) cannot as of this writing accommodate survey weights. Because the
vote choice dependent variable is binary, some analysts would opt for a binary choice model such as logit or probit,
but this is unnecessary in our setting because, as shown by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), OLS is a
consistent estimator of the AMCE. As it happens, the estimated marginal effects from a logit model correspond almost
exactly to the OLS estimates and none of our substantive interpretations depend on this choice.
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3.5 Results
We will present three sets of results. First, we will examine the effects of candidate attributes,
split by election type. Second, we will split our samples by respondent partisanship in order to
examine the possibly heterogeneous effects of candidate attributes and election types. Third, we
will examine a possible mechanism (perceptions of competence) by which election type affects the
attributes that voters favor.
3.5.1 Effects of Partisan Elections on Candidate Choice
Figure A.2 presents the results of the MTurk study. In the first column, the estimates of Equa-
tion 3.1 are shown. The strongest effects are observed for the political experience attribute. Rela-
tive to a candidate with no political experience, respondents prefer candidates who are City Council
Members, State Legislators, Mayors, or Representatives in Congress by a margin of 25 to 30 per-
centage points. Candidates who previously held a mayoral office were rewarded most for their po-
litical experience. By contrast, we observe relatively muted effects for the job experience, race, age,
and gender attributes, although our respondents do express a mild preference for candidates who
are female and nonwhite. Our respondents’ preferences for candidates varied non-monotonically
with age: 45-year-olds are preferred to 35-year-olds and 55- and 65-year olds.
In partisan elections, we observe a similar pattern, though the effects for the political experience
variables are more muted. On average, our sample prefers independents to partisan candidates of
either stripe, though this average masks some heterogeneity by respondent party identification, as
we will explore in the next section.
The final column of Figure A.2 shows the difference between partisan and nonpartisan elec-
tions across the attributes they have in common. For job experience, race, age, and gender, the
presence or absence of party labels makes no difference. However, we do observe statistically sig-
nificantly different weight being given to the political experience variables, depending on election
type. In nonpartisan elections, the effects of candidates’ political experience are approximately 10
percentage points larger than in partisan elections.
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Figure A.3 presents the identical analyses using the YouGov data. Overall, we observe a very
similar pattern of results. In nonpartisan elections, political experience is heavily rewarded. We
added the “School Board President” level to test the alternative explanation that respondents prefer
any experience to “No Political Experience.” Indeed, respondents do prefer school board presidents
to political neophytes, but higher offices are nevertheless preferred to school board presidents as
well. In the YouGov sample, we observe a similar interaction between election type and the effects
of political experience. Political experience matters more in nonpartisan elections.
We added the “Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom” and “Electrician” levels to the job experience at-
tribute.7 Both of these careers were viewed negatively in both partisan and nonpartisan elections.
We observe similarly small effects of gender and age in the YouGov sample as we did in the MTurk
sample.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Respondent Partisanship
In Figures 3.4 and 3.5, we reproduce the main analyses, splitting the samples based on respondents’
own partisanship. As shown in the top center panel of each figure, Democrats dislike Republican
candidates and Republicans dislike Democratic candidates. The differences in these preferences
are large and statistically significant. Intriguingly, in both the MTurk and YouGov samples, parti-
sans dislike the out-party (relative to an independent candidate) more than they like the in-party.
Given the ambiguity surrounding an unknown independent candidate’s policy positions or ideol-
ogy, respondents may optimistically perceive independents as sharing their own preferences (Tomz
and Van Houweling 2009).
When we disaggregate by respondent partisan identification, we do see some small patterns
with respect to candidate gender and race emerge. Republican respondents marginally prefer white
candidates while Democrats marginally prefer nonwhite candidates. Republicans do not appear to
have a gender preference, while Democrats are 10 percentage points more likely to choose a female
candidate than a male candidate. These race and gender patterns do not differ much by election
type.
7For female candidates, the level was “Stay-at-Home Mom” while it was “Stay-at-Home Dad” for male candidates.
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Figure 3.2: Mechanical Turk Main Analysis
Dependent Variable: Candidate Preference
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Figure 3.3: YouGov Main Analysis
Dependent Variable: Candidate Preference
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Turning next to political experience, Republicans and Democrats both reward more highly-
experienced candidates in both partisan and nonpartisan elections. However, our main theoretical
prediction – that political experience will matter more in nonpartisan elections than in partisan
elections – is only borne out among Democratic respondents, not Republican respondents. This
pattern is clearest in the MTurk sample, though it does obtain in the YouGov sample as well. It
may be that, in the absence of party labels, Republicans and Democrats turn to different markers
of competence. In the YouGov sample, Republican respondents give greater weight to occupa-
tional experience in nonpartisan elections, while Democratic respondents give greater weight to
political experience. These findings resonate with those of Sadin (2014) who finds that candidates’
occupations influence perceptions of their ideology.
3.5.3 Mechanism: Candidate Competence
Thus far, our findings show that the absence of party labels changes the types of candidates that
respondents prefer. Doubtless many pathways from nonpartisan elections to vote choice could
be responsible for these effects. Existing theory and evidence highlights at least one possibility:
perceptions of candidate competence. Lacking a clear party cue, respondents try to infer candidate
competence from the information available to them. In this section, we focus on the plausibility of
this competence mechanism, but we acknowledge that nonpartisan elections likely influence vote
choice through many causal pathways of which competence is only one. We briefly consider two
more pathways (perceptions of candidate ideology and satisficing) at the end of this section.
In order to assess the possiblity that the nonpartisan treatment operates by changing peceptions
of candidate competence, we asked respondents to rate the competence of both candidates on a
scale ranging from 0 - 100. This measure will help us to substantiate a pillar of our main theoretical
claim: in nonpartisan elections compared to partisan elections, voters will give relatively more
weight to nonideological dimensions when evaluating candidates. While we cannot conduct a
formal mediation analysis here because the required assumption of sequential ignorability (Imai
et al. 2011) is difficult to justify in this context, this mechanism is rendered more plausible if we
observe the same pattern of treatment effects on the competence dependent variable as we did for
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Figure 3.4: Mechanical Turk Heterogeneous Effects Analysis
Dependent Variable: Candidate Preference
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Figure 3.5: YouGov Heterogeneous Effects Analysis
Dependent Variable: Candidate Preference
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vote choice.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 repeat the analyses presented in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 using the competence
dependent variable. Most importantly, both Republicans and Democrats rate candidates as more
competent when they have more political experience. As shown in the difference column, Demo-
cratic respondents (but not Republican respondents) rate such candidates as even more competent
in the absence of party labels. We observe small effects of race, gender, and age on compe-
tence ratings, although across both datasets, Republican respondents appear to rate white candi-
dates as marginally more competent than nonwhite candidates, while the opposite pattern holds
for Democratic respondents. We observe larger differences in competence ratings by occupation,
with Republican respondents rating police officers, small business owners, and business executives
more highly than educators, while Democrats hold the opposite views on such candidates. Neither
party’s respondents rated stay-at-home parents as more competent than educators.
These figures lend support to the idea that in nonpartisan elections, voters prefer more experi-
enced candidates because they give greater weight to nonideological dimensions. The same candi-
date types that respondents view as more competent are the ones that they tend to elect at higher
rates in nonpartisan elections. We do, however, interpret these results with caution as there may be
other (unmeasured) pathways beyond competence by which voters prefer some types more in non-
partisan elections. For example, it is plausible that party labels remind subjects of rancorous party
politics, which in turn makes them marginally more likely to select outsider candidates. While we
do not think this explanation is particularly likely, we cannot rule it (or other similar explanations)
out as a possible mechanism by which nonpartisan elections affect candidate choice.
Beyond the competence mechanism, the effects of nonpartisan elections may operate through
perceptions of candidate ideology. In an effort to address this possibility, we asked respondents
how likely candidates would be to achieve certain ideologically-inflected policy goals. The results
(presented in detail in Appendix C.2) suggest that respondents, regardless of party, use occupation
as a shortcut for ideology in nonpartisan elections. For example, both Democrats and Republicans
view small business owners and business executives as more likely to implement conservative poli-
cies, and there is some suggestive evidence that this effect is stronger in nonpartisan elections. A
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Figure 3.6: Mechanical Turk Heterogeneous Effects Analysis
Dependent Variable: Competence
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Figure 3.7: YouGov Heterogeneous Effects Analysis
Dependent Variable: Competence
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link between candidate occupation and perceived ideology could help explain the heterogeneous
effects of occupation, but our analyses also signal that something more than ideology influences
respondents in a nonpartisan setting. Indeed, Democrats prefer experienced candidates in nonpar-
tisan elections, but they do not see these candidates as more likely to implement liberal policies.
Finally, a more pedestrian mechanism that could account for our findings is satisficing (Hain-
mueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2015). Because subjects evaluate candidates on five attributes in
the nonpartisan elections and on six attributes in the partisan elections, they may mechanically as-
sign more weight to remaining traits when party is omitted. To address this possibility, we exploit
a situation in which the number of attributes stays fixed but partisanship varies. Such a scenario
arises when subjects evaluate a pair of candidates that share the same partisanship versus when
they evaluate a pair who are from different parties. Appendix C.3 reports the results of this analy-
sis. At least in the Mechanical Turk sample, we find that subjects give greater weight to political
experience in same-party elections compared with cross-party elections.
3.6 Discussion
Drawing on both observational and experimental data, we have shown how a specific electoral
institution – nonpartisan balloting – can influence candidate selection. We relied on a theory of
candidate choice that posits that in the absence of the party label shortcut, voters have more diffi-
culty inferring the ideology of candidates and as a result rely more heavily on other characteristics.
The implications of this theory of candidate choice were borne out in two survey experiments
conducted on both convenience and nationally representative samples. The institutional context
matters for the evaluation of candidates based on their attributes. The effect of previous political
experience was shown to be statistically significantly larger in nonpartisan elections. This finding
directly supports our major theoretical prediction. Our results are also consistent with earlier stud-
ies that find candidate quality, particularly incumbency, is more consequential when party does not
appear on the ballot (e.g., Schaffner, Streb and Wright 2001; Lim and Snyder 2015).
We conducted our experiment twice, once on a convenience sample and again on a nation-
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ally representative sample. In the appendix, we explore the correspondence across samples more
deeply, finding that the correlation of effect estimates is very strong at 0.95. Thus, our findings con-
tribute to a small but growing literature on the correspondence of survey experimental estimates
across samples (e.g., Mullinix et al. (2016)).
The conjoint experimental design allows us to avoid many of the challenges inherent in study-
ing nonpartisan elections, in particular the problem that cities with partisan and nonpartisan elec-
tions may differ in systematic ways. The survey experimental design ensures the clear delineation
of partisan and nonpartisan contests. However, these studies were not without limitations. First,
we are unable to account for local political contexts. Factors such as retrospective evaluations
(Oliver, Ha and Callen 2012) or inter-group conflict (Kaufmann 2004) might alter the salience and
effects of certain cues; we did not control in any way the other features of the electoral context
that our subjects may have been imagining. Second, hypothetical candidate choice is related to,
but distinct from, actual vote choice. However, it is unclear which way the “biases” from this dif-
ference would cut. Considering the thin information environment, one might make the claim that
the effect of the electoral institution on the weight given to nonpartisan attributes is understated in
these experiments.
These results have important implications for the institutional features of elections beyond
local contests. Some hold the normative position that members of the judiciary should be selected
for their competence not their ideology. Our results suggest that nonpartisan elections may be a
powerful institutional tool for achieving this goal. Voters in primary elections seek to know the
ideological positions of candidates but cannot rely on a party cue. In this constrained information
environment, voters may give special consideration to candidates’ backgrounds and resumes.
In particular, we manipulated the presence of one shortcut and measured its effects on other
shortcuts. Voters seek to make the best decisions possible, given available knowledge and a con-
strained budget for acquiring new information. When one cue – for example party labels – is no
longer available, voters turn to other sources of information.
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Chapter 4
The Business of Being Mayor
4.1 Introduction
Fundamental to the study of politics are questions about whether and how political leaders influ-
ence outcomes. I investigate these questions in the context of U.S. cities. Simply put, do mayors
matter? In contrast to the ideologically charged debates of national politics, the substance and
purpose of local government is funding and delivering essential services. From mundane tasks
like plowing snow and picking up garbage to preventing crime and fighting fires, city governments
provide essential services that are central to the public’s safety and quality of life. Because mu-
nicipal services are such a critical feature of public life, successes and failures are readily visible
to local residents, as well as prospective residents, consumers, and businesses. Are traffic signals
functional and potholes filled? Are streets and parks clean and safe? Even voters with little knowl-
edge of politics or government can easily notice a decline in the quality or quantity of services, an
uptick in crime, or an increase in their tax bills.
Voters may use elections to hold politicians accountable for shortcomings or failures, but they
also may try to select leaders who will produce desired outcomes (Fearon 1999; Besley 2006). As
a city’s chief executive, the mayor is the highest profile local politician. Case studies of American
cites portray individual mayors as crucial actors with the ability to shape the fortunes of their cities
(e.g., Ferman 1985; Stone 1989; DeLeon 1995; Fuchs 1992; Inman 1995). Although mayors are
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unquestionably important actors, they also have been understudied. The mayor is the face and
name of municipal government, but do mayors influence policy choices and outcomes? Efforts to
answer this question have been constrained by a lack of detailed data about mayors and complicated
by the methodological challenges of separating the effects of mayors from other observed and
unobserved factors that could affect both mayoral characteristics and policy outcomes.
In recent years, several empirical studies have examined the causal effects of mayors’ partisan-
ship and produced conflicting and largely null results. Electing a Democrat or Republican has little
effect on the size of local government, the allocation of resources, or crime (Ferreira and Gyourko
2009, but see also de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016). In large cities, however, electing a
Democratic mayor may lead to a decline in spending on public safety but has no significant effect
on a host of other spending and revenue items (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). While these studies
provide reasons to question mayors’ abilities to influence policy, their focus on partisanship also
presents complications. Studies of US politics at the national and state level consistently find that
Democrats and Republicans have distinct preferences associated with divergent policy outcomes
(e.g., Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Bartels 2008; Erikson,
Wright and McIver 1993), but the role of partisanship at the local level is less straightforward.
Although party tends to be a strong predictor of choices of both voters and elites (Campbell
et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006), the major-
ity of U.S. local elections are nonpartisan. In some nonpartisan cities, candidates’ party affiliations
may be widely known even if they do not appear on the ballot. However, in many others, mayors’
party affiliations remain unknown even after extensive research. As a result, these mayors and
cities are excluded from any analysis—-including those cited above—-that relies on partisanship
to assess the ability of mayors to affect outcomes. At the same time, party may be less salient in
local politics (Oliver, Ha and Callen 2012). Many of the core functions of cities, such as essential
service provision, land use, and public safety, produce policy debates and choices that can be diffi-
cult to cast in starkly partisan terms. As the adage goes, there is no Republican or Democratic way
to collect trash.
In contrast to earlier studies, I focus on candidates’ occupational backgrounds. Specifically, I
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ask whether electing a mayor with experience as a business owner or executive leads to systemat-
ically different policy outcomes. Business owners and executives are especially well represented
in city halls across the country, and local policies have implications for the success of local busi-
nesses. Descriptive theories of urban politics depict business interests as prominent stakeholders
with strong preferences and considerable influence over local policy choices (Logan and Molotch
1987; Stone 1989). Broadly, this literature implies that business executives, particularly those
who own or operate local businesses, will favor policies they expect to foster economic growth.
Business owners and executives are likely to have strong preferences for low taxes and limited
redistribution but high-quality services and amenities. Executive business experience also may
constitute a salient cue for voters as they evaluate candidates and select a mayor—especially in the
nonpartisan elections so common in U.S. cities.
To assess the impact of business executive mayors, I compiled data on the the backgrounds of
mayoral candidates from cities across the United States. This extensive original dataset includes
3,257 mayoral candidates from 263 U.S. cities and covers the time period 1950 to 2007. Additional
data include measures of municipal finances from the U.S. Census of Governments and the Annual
Survey of Governments, which enable me to test the effect of electing a business executive mayor
on a range of fiscal outcomes, such as expenditures, revenue, and taxes. To address concerns over
endogeneity, namely the possibility that factors related to how likely a city is to elect a business
executive also determine policy outcomes, I adopt a regression discontinuity design (RDD). With
the RDD, I leverage election results to compare outcomes in cities that narrowly elect a business
executive to outcomes in cities where a business executive loses by a slim margin. Focusing on
cities that are similar in propensity to elect a business executive mitigates the threat that observed
or unobserved confounders could bias the results.
To preview my empirical results, I find that business owners and executives do produce system-
atically different fiscal outcomes. My results yield little evidence to suggest that business executive
mayors have a major impact on overall spending or revenue. However, business executive mayors
do influence spending across policy areas. My findings indicate that electing a business executive
leads to significantly lower levels of spending on housing and community development—spending
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that typically is redistributive in nature. At the same time, I also find evidence of an increase in
spending on roads in cities that elect business executives. Some suggestive evidence also indicates
that business executive mayors may increase revenue from local sources, but likely in the form of
user fees and charges rather than taxes. Finally, further analyses support the notion that experience
as a business owner or executive is not simply a proxy for political party.
Overall, my findings suggest that who serves as mayor has implications for policy choices and
outcomes. In particular, these changes limit the potential for redistribution. These results not only
provide evidence that mayors matter but also speak to research and debates surrounding repre-
sentation and inequality. Empirical evidence from a variety of contexts suggests that descriptive
representation has meaningful policy consequences (see e.g., Whitby 1997; Besley and Case 2003;
Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Much of this work has focused on race, gender, and ethnicity,
but recent studies have highlighted the underrepresentation of the working class. The empirical
results presented here are quite consistent with existing studies that use occupation as a proxy for
class and find evidence that the overrepresentation of the affluent in U.S. legislatures leads to more
conservative economic policy (Carnes 2012, 2013). In contrast, however, this study focuses on
elected executives, incorporating original data on both election winners and runners-up in an effort
to establish a causal link between mayors and public policy.
4.2 Does it Matter Who Serves?
Canonical models of party competition yield the median voter theorem, which implies that can-
didates for office will converge to the policy position that best matches the preferences of the
median voter, so different leaders should produce similar outcomes (Downs 1957). Other models
(e.g., Alesina 1988; Besley and Coate 1997), however, imply that if politicians care not only about
winning election but also about policy outcomes, they have incentives to follow their own policy
preferences. In these models, forward looking voters account for these incentives, and politicians
cannot credibly commit to moderate policies. As a result, to the extent that candidates’ have dis-
tinct preferences and policy objectives, different leaders may produce divergent outcomes.
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Contrary to the expectations of the Downsian model, Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001)
analyze the ideological positions of congressional candidates over more than 100 years and doc-
ument a pattern of non-convergence at both the national and district levels. They find candidates’
positions tend to reflect the national party rather than the median voter, although more competitive
races exhibit greater convergence. Once elected, Republicans and Democrats in Congress exhibit
ideologically distinct behavior (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), and differences in party control are
associated with contrasting policies, particularly on issues concerning taxing and spending (Mc-
Carty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006; Bartels 2008). Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004, p. 810) go so far
as to argue that rather than influencing politicians, “voters elect policies through choosing a legis-
lator [emphasis in the original],” showing that even winners of highly competitive Congressional
races fail to pursue moderate policies once in office.
Several studies also have sought to identify the causal effect of mayoral partisanship on local
fiscal policy, and despite partially conflicting results, the overall findings suggest a much weaker
link between party and policy than we typically observe at higher levels of U.S. politics. Ferreira
and Gyourko (2009) examine the effect of mayors’ partisanship on local public finances and invoke
Tiebout sorting to explain their null results, suggesting that the degree of preference heterogeneity
within cities is generally insufficient to support partisan policy differentiation. On the other hand,
Gerber and Hopkins (2011) find that the election of a Democratic mayor leads to a decline in
public safety spending but has little effect on other aspects of municipal finance. The authors
contend that although the effects of partisanship may be muted in areas of limited or overlapping
authority, mayors can influence outcomes in policy domains exclusively under local control. Yet,
across 19 fiscal policy measures, mayoral partisanship has a significant effect on police spending
alone. Most recently, however, de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016) provide evidence that
Democratic mayors do increase the size of municipal government, issuing more debt to support
greater spending overall.
Despite the primacy of partisanship, other attributes of leaders can affect behavior and out-
comes as well—-particularly when politicians’ characteristics are linked to distinct policy prefer-
ences. When members of underrepresented groups gain policymaking influence, they can have
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measurable effects on policy. Several studies find a link between legislators’ racial minority group
membership and roll call voting behavior with African American members of Congress more likely
to support legislation that advances group interests (e.g., Canon 1999; Whitby 1997). Assessing
representation of African Americans in state legislatures, Owens (2005) finds that advances in de-
scriptive representation lead to increased spending in policy domains important to black legislators
and their constituents. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) exploit a policy intervention that randomly
assigned Indian villages to reserve council positions for women to identify their effect on policy
choices. Representation of women led to changes in public goods provision that reflected women’s
policy preferences and priorities. In the American states, Besley and Case (2003) find a positive
relationship between the share of women in state legislatures and increased family assistance and
stronger child-support laws. In contrast, Carnes (2013) argues that the overrepresentation of the
affluent generally leads to more conservative economic policy choices.
Although Carnes (2013) notes greater class diversity among politicians at the local level, com-
pared to state legislatures or Congress, it appears that business backgrounds are more common than
working-class occupations. Using data from the International City/County Manager Association
(ICMA), Carnes finds that working-class members make up the majority of city councils in a few
cities but also that business owners and executives are extremely well represented. Examining the
relationship between the class or occupational composition of a city council and the share of the
city budget allocated to welfare spending reveals a notable trend. “[T]owns and cities led by coun-
cils with greater shares of farm owners or managers, business owners or executives, and technical
professionals...devoted little or nothing to social programs” (Carnes 2013, p. 130). Although he
attempts to account for a range of potential confounders, the author also acknowledges the pos-
sibility that factors other than class could determine local welfare spending. Indeed, including
city-level covariates in the analysis calls into question the significance of the relationship between
class and welfare spending. Though, as Carnes (2013) mentions, cities also have limited flexibility
to adopt progressive economic policies.
The mixed results from empirical studies of mayoral influence are often consistent with the
idea that constraints on cities limit the effects of local politics, but some evidence suggests the
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implications are more nuanced. For example, Craw (2010) acknowledges that competition among
cities appears to curb spending but also finds that lower levels of capital mobility can enable lo-
cal officials to pursue divergent policies on social welfare provision. Holman (2014) argues that
cities with female mayors are more likely to provide social welfare programs, although other re-
search finds gender has no significant effect on the size of local government or the composition
of spending (Ferreira and Gyourko 2014). Studies assessing the impact of racial and ethnic mi-
nority mayors also produce conflicting results. Although Karnig and Welch (1980) find that black
mayors preside over increases in social welfare spending, Pelissero, Holian and Tomaka (2000)
provide empirical evidence suggesting that electing an African American or Latino mayor does
not lead to significant differences in fiscal policy (see also Nelson 1978). Most recently, Hopkins
and McCabe (2012) assess the influence of African American mayors in large U.S. cities and find
that electing a black mayor leads to reductions in police staffing and payrolls but otherwise has no
significant effect on the allocation of resources. In light of these results, the authors conclude “that
among issues, criminal justice alone combines the conditions necessary to allow for local politics
to shape local policy” (Hopkins and McCabe 2012, p. 692).
Indeed, the formal and informal constraints on local governments imply that mayors may be
unable to have policy influence comparable to politicians in other contexts—cities may present a
hard test for the effects of political leaders. Building on Tiebout’s (1956) insight that citizens “vote
with their feet,” Peterson (1981) argues that competition for mobile taxpayers essentially underpins
all urban policy choices. As a result, the range of viable local policy options is sharply curtailed,
rendering local politics largely inconsequential. In contrast, Stone’s (1989) regime theory implies
that precisely because of the constraints on local governments, politics is vitally important. Where
local government officials and organized interests can maintain durable coalitions, informal public-
private regimes can channel resources toward shaping agendas and advancing policy goals.
Evidence from a variety of political contexts supports a link between leaders and public policy,
that is policymakers with distinct preferences tend to produce divergent outcomes. Yet, efforts to
assess the impact of mayors have produced conflicting findings and a lack of consensus. It may
be, as Peterson (1981) implies, that the constraints and limitations on local governments allow
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few, if any, opportunities for mayors to influence policy. However, discrepancies across studies
may reflect differences in study samples, time periods or research designs.1 For example, early
research on the influence of African American mayors had small samples of 6 to 17 cities, partly
because they cover a time period where few cities elected black mayors (Richard Hatcher of Gary,
Indiana, and Carl Stokes of Cleveland, Ohio, both elected in 1967 were among the earliest African
American mayors of major U.S. cities). Several of these studies rely on multivariate regression
analyses, but Pelissero, Holian and Tomaka (2000) use a matching design, while others (Ferreira
and Gyourko 2009, 2014; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Hopkins and McCabe 2012) rely on regres-
sion discontinuity designs (RDDs). Although an RDD can support the identification of causal
effects, the resulting estimates are local average treatment effects. That is, these analyses estimate
the effect of narrowly electing a certain type of leader, so we might not expect results consistent
with studies that estimate average effects.
Although differences in study samples and research designs may partly explain conflicting re-
sults, we might also question which attributes of leaders are likely to be associated with differences
in policies and outcomes. Recall that formal theoretical models (e.g., Alesina 1988; Besley and
Coate 1997) predict divergent outcomes when politicians have distinct preferences. For example,
as Ferreira and Gyourko (2014, p. 28) acknowledge, “for the gender of the mayor to have any im-
pact first requires that men and women have different preferences for the goods and services that
local governments provide.” The authors draw on studies at the state and national level, highlight-
ing evidence that women’s preferences can be differentiated on issues such as education, health,
and redistribution. However, local governments, particularly in smaller cities, may not be active
in relevant policy areas. At the local level, school districts generally establish education policies,
1For example, Pelissero, Holian and Tomaka (2000) compare outcomes in 12 cities (6 matched pairs) over the
time period of 1972 to 1992, and Karnig and Welch (1980) analyze a sample of 17 cities covering the years1968 to
1975. In their main regression discontinuity analysis, Hopkins and McCabe (2012) rely on a sample of 149 elections
in 76 large cities. Holman (2014) analyzes the relationship between women’s representation in 2007 and city budgets
in 2008 in a sample of 214 cities with populations of at least 5,000. Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) use a regression
discontinuity design to estimate the effect of narrowly electing a female mayor on a variety of outcomes in 575 cities
with populations of at least 25,000.
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and although cities do engage in redistribution, their ability to do so is typically limited by formal
and informal constraints (Peterson 1981). Similarly, differences by political party also may be less
salient at the local level. In his study of local elections, Oliver, Ha and Callen (2012) highlights the
contrast between the ideological nature of national politics and what he describes as the “manage-
rial” character of local democracy— particularly in smaller cities. Unlike national policy concerns
such as health care, national security, or immigration, core local policy domains include service
provision, zoning, and land use, which are typically difficult to cast in starkly partisan terms. The
prevalence of nonpartisan electoral institutions also complicates efforts to understand the effect of
party at the local level. The majority of local elections in the U.S. are nonpartisan. In some nonpar-
tisan elections, candidates’ party affiliations are easily accessible, but in cases where partisanship
is unknown, cities must be excluded from any analysis of the effect of party.
4.2.1 Business Executives as Politicians
When business executives run for office, they often emphasize their business knowledge and man-
agement skills. Candidates’ claims often echo the rhetoric of municipal reformers who maintained
that the core function of city government—service provision—requires technical expertise rather
than political skill. Probably not coincidentally, business leaders were advocates of the reform
movement, which sought to shift the balance of power in city politics toward more affluent citi-
zens (Bridges 1997). Among their priorities were quality services and amenities combined with
limited redistribution to keep local taxes in check. This parallel between city government and
business, however, also reflects the challenges of municipal budgeting. In particular, Fuchs (1996,
p. 70) argues that following federal disengagement from cities and the urban fiscal crises of the
1970s, issues of efficiency and financial management came to dominate local policy agendas, with
an emphasis on “treating citizens like customers and forcing governments to think like private
businesses.”
In cities across the U.S., candidates routinely invoke the relevance and value of business expe-
rience. A 1969 advertisement for Amarillo (TX) mayor J. Ernest Stroud described the incumbent
as “a self-made businessman” who “knows the true value of the dollar.” In contrast, his opponent
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was described as “a puppet of the political bosses” who “plans to spend with wild abandon.” When
she filed papers to run for mayor of San Bernardino (CA), Judith Valles said she would use her
“experience balancing multi-million dollar budgets and managing large-scale institutions to revi-
talize [the] city” (quoted in Precinct Reporter, July 17, 1997). In 2001, Republican Dennis Odle
ran for mayor of Waterbury (CT) with the slogan “All Business, No Politics” (The Brass File [The
Waterbury Observer], October 14, 2007). Similar examples abound, from Quincy, Massachusetts
to Waukesha, Wisconsin and from Dallas, Texas to San Diego, California.2
While experience owning or operating a business may foster leadership skills or enhance the
ability to persuade or influence others (see e.g., Besley 2005), promises to increase efficiency and
attract economic activity also convey policy preferences and priorities. Moreover, recent empirical
evidence suggests that candidates’ occupations influence voters’ evaluations. Using occupation as
a proxy for social class, Sadin (2014) finds that survey respondents perceive affluent candidates as
more competent compared to those with working class occupations. Although her study focuses on
class, occupation itself seems to have an independent effect on inferences about policy positions.
Regardless of party affiliation, a wealthy candidate with a business background is viewed as more
conservative on economic policy, but if a similar candidate is described as a cardiologist, class or
occupation has no effect on perceptions of ideology. Using a conjoint survey experiment, Kirkland
and Coppock (2017) find that evaluations vary with the respondents’ party identification. Perhaps
not surprisingly, Republicans view business owners or executives more favorably than Democrats
do.
These findings suggest that executive business experience may be a meaningful cue to voters,
but there are also reasons to expect that business owners and executives may have distinctive pol-
icy preferences. For example, Carnes (2012) finds that members of Congress with business back-
grounds consistently vote more conservatively than members with working class backgrounds. Yet
2Specific examples cited here include Francis X. McCauley mayor of Quincy, Massachusetts from 1982 to 1989
(Boston Globe November 1, 1981); Robert J. Foley, Sr., candidate in Waukesha, WI (Milwaukee Journal March 30,
1994); Fred Meyer, candidate in Dallas, Texas (Boston Globe May 5, 1987); Bill Cleator, candidate in San Diego,
California (Los Angeles Times May 18, 1986).
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specific policy considerations also could be especially salient at the local level. Zoning, land use,
and tax policies are of particular concern to business interests that see these domains as key to
promoting growth and securing economic benefits (Logan and Molotch 1987).
Local policies can have a direct impact on local business owners by determining tax obliga-
tions and the quality of services, but broader policy implications could also influence the fortunes
of local businesses. For example, reliable municipal services, desirable amenities, and low taxes
may make a city attractive to both businesses and consumers of goods and services, creating a
vital local economy (Peterson 1981). Indeed, Logan and Molotch (1987) contend that business in-
terests, preoccupied with increasing land values and promoting growth, prefer policies that create
a hospitable environment for commerce but do not necessarily yield comparable benefits for all
citizens. The effective provision of basic municipal services is essential, but the activities of gov-
ernment should be limited to keep tax rates in check. While Logan and Molotch (1987) provide
a theoretical rationale for the policy preferences and goals of business executives, Stone (1989)
also provides concrete examples of differences between business leaders and residents, describing
citizen opposition to downtown revitalization and infrastructure expansion initiatives.
Local fiscal policies can quite literally affect the cost of doing business in a city, so business
owners and executives are likely to be keenly aware of the tradeoffs between taxes and services.
Given their exposure to local policies and their experience with broader markets, business own-
ers and executives may think in terms quite similar to the tax-benefit ratio described by Peterson
(1981). As a result, I expect business executive mayors to pursue policies that prioritize municipal
services and amenities while avoiding redistribution. Given the constraints that local policymak-
ers face, however, the effects of business executive mayors may be limited in scope or magnitude.
Still, like leaders differentiated by other characteristics, mayors with executive business experience
are likely to have an impact on local policies leading to divergent fiscal policies.
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4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Empirical Strategy
An inherent challenge in identifying the effects of local leaders arises from the possibility that
both observed and unobserved differences in cities determine what types of leaders they elect.
Mayors’ attributes or experience are not randomly assigned to cities, and factors that influence local
electoral choices also may affect fiscal outcomes. To address concerns over endogeneity, I employ
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the effect of electing a business executive
mayor. The RDD has become a common approach used in political science to identify causal
effects with observational data (e.g., Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004; Lee 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko
2009, 2014; Gerber and Hopkins 2011). A quasi-experimental design, the RDD is distinguished
by its reliance on a forcing or assignment variable, a measure of the underlying probability of
exposure to treatment. At some threshold value of the rating variable, the probability of treatment
changes discontinuously. For example, vote share captures the underlying probability of winning
an election and exhibits a sharp discontinuity at 50%—a candidate’s vote share must exceed this
threshold to win.
In this case, the treatment of interest is a mayor with executive business experience, and the
underlying measure of support for a business executive candidate is her margin of victory (mea-
sured in terms of vote share).3 If and only if a business executive candidate wins the largest share
of the vote—that is, the margin of victory is a positive value, the city is assigned to the business
executive treatment. Thus, the vote share margin serves as the assignment, or rating, variable,
and 0% is a sharp threshold that determines treatment assignment. While candidates surely have
some influence over their vote shares, it seems quite unlikely that they can precisely manipulate
the assignment variable. As long as candidates lack precise control over the assignment variable,
an important consequence is that near the threshold, assignment to treatment is as-if random (Lee
2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010, p. 283). The “no sorting” assumption is the key identifying as-
3Some elections include more than 2 candidates. Margin of victory is defined as the difference in the vote shares
of the top two candidates.
CHAPTER 4. THE BUSINESS OF BEING MAYOR 70
sumption of the RDD—that potential outcomes are smooth across the discontinuity. I investigate
the validity of this assumption formally using the McCrary (2008) test of the density of the rating
variable and find no evidence of sorting (log difference in heights is -0.187 with SE 0.202; p =
0.355). Because treatment assignment is as-if random, it is not necessary to include covariates in
RD specifications, but covariates may be included to improve the precision of treatment effect es-
timates (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Testing the continuity of covariates also supports the validity of
the RDD.4 By focusing on close elections, I can compare outcomes in cities that are quite similar
in propensity to elect a business executive mayor but differ in actual leader experience, mitigating
the threat of omitted variable bias.
Although an RDD can facilitate causal inference from observational data, this strategy has
important implications in terms of both data and results. An RDD that relies on election results for
its rating variable requires data on not only mayors but also runners-up, but not all election results
will enter into the analysis. First, to estimate the effect of electing a business executive mayor, I
must focus on races where one candidate possesses executive business experience and the other
does not. Although my mayoral candidates data covers 1217 complete elections, only 520 meet
this criterion. Ideally, estimation will rely on observations that lie close to the threshold (Imbens
and Lemieux 2008), which can further diminish the relevant sample size.
The aim of an RD analysis is to use the observations around the threshold in the rating variable
to estimate the size of the jump at the discontinuity, but across studies there are differences in
estimation strategies. In practice, RDD applications commonly have relied on alternative global
specifications that control for higher-order polynomials of the forcing variable. However, recent
work suggests that this method may produce misleading estimates and strongly advises use of
local linear specifications (Gelman and Imbens 2014; Skovron and Titiunik 2016). One concern
is that higher-order polynomial specifications can heavily weight observations that lie far from
the discontinuity. In contrast, local polynomial methods rely only on observations that lie within a
specified distance—-or bandwidth—-spanning the threshold of the forcing variable. Because RDD
results can hinge on specification and bandwidth choices, current best practices call for the use of
4Additional details on covariate continuity tests and other validity tests are included in the Appendix.
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local linear regression combined with a data-driven approach to determining the bandwidth that
minimizes the mean squared error (MSE) of the RD estimator (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
2014, see also Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012).
In the analyses that follow, I rely on local linear regression and use optimal bandwidths calcu-
lated per Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) to estimate the effects of narrowly electing a busi-
ness executive. Because the MSE-optimal bandwidth often seems subjectively wide—i.e., beyond
what we might consider a “close” electoral margin, I also include estimates using a 5% bandwidth.
That is, all observations within 5% on either side of the cutpoint are used in the estimation, and
observations are weighted by proximity to the cutpoint. Some very recent methodological work
on RDDs advocates the use of robust bias-corrected confidence intervals (Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik 2014; Skovron and Titiunik 2016). In the main text, I report robust standard errors, but
replicating these analyses with robust bias-corrected confidence intervals produces substantively
similar results (presented in the Appendix).5
Throughout this analysis, I estimate models of the following form:
Yit+2 = β0 + β1Business Executive Winit + f(Vit) + it, (4.1)
where Business Executive Winit is an dichotomous variable indicating whether a business ex-
ecutive candidate won the mayoral election in city i in year t, and β1 is the quantity of interest, the
estimate of the effect of a mayor with executive business experience. The variable Yit+2 is a rele-
vant fiscal outcome measured two years after the mayoral election. My analysis considers several
public finance outcomes, including total expenditures, total revenue, total taxes, and total charges
and fees, as well as the allocation of resources across key spending categories (e.g., administration,
health, housing, parks, public safety, roads, and solid waste management). Mayoral terms of office
vary across cities, so outcomes measured two years after the city election allow time for a mayor
to pursue her policy goals while remaining within the two-year term maintained by some cities.
The term f(Vit) represents a flexible function of the rating variable, i.e., the business executive’s
vote-share margin (vote share centered at 0). For example, if a business executive candidate wins
5Clustering standard errors at the city level also produces similar results (not inluded).
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election with 52% of the vote, the executive margin would be 0.02, and if the same candidate loses
with 48% of the vote, the rating variable would take the value -0.02. Following convention, f(Vit)
typically includes the forcing variable and the interaction of the forcing and treatment indicator
variables. (Lee and Lemieux 2010).
4.3.2 Elections, Candidates, & Local Fiscal Policy
To test for mayors’ effects on fiscal policy in U.S. cities, I have assembled data from multiple
sources covering candidates’ backgrounds, public finance outcomes, and local elections. I focus
on a sample of 248 U.S. cities with populations of at least 50,000 as of the 2000 U.S. Census,
and the data cover the time period 1950 to 2007. The determination of the population cutoff was
informed by an interest in allowing considerable variation in city population size while ensuring
availability of relevant information about mayoral elections and candidates. Table 4.1 reports mea-
sures from the 2000 Census to describe the cities included in the sample, as well as those that
remain in the RD sample (cities where a business executive faces a non-business executive candi-
date). As a point of reference, descriptive statistics for all cities of comparable population are also
provided. Overall, the cities included in my sample have noticeably larger populations. Sample
cities have, on average, slightly higher shares of white residents with similar median household
incomes, home ownership rates, and house values. Aside from population, the samples appear to
be quite representative of U.S. cities with populations of at least 50,000.
To assemble a new dataset of mayoral candidates’ backgrounds, I began with an existing dataset
of U.S. mayoral elections collected via a survey of cities and townships. 6 I collected details about
candidates and their backgrounds from several sources, most commonly from contemporary news
reports, obituaries, and biographies provided by city websites and documents, the Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress, and the National Governors Association. From the raw
6Election data were provided by Fernando Ferreira and Joseph Gyourko, who collected the data via a survey of
US cities and townships with a population of more than 25,000 people as of the year 2000. These data were used in
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) as well as Ferreira and Gyourko (2014).
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Table 4.1: Sample of Cities
Cities with > 50,000 Current Sample— Current Sample—
Population Mayors Data RD Analysis
Number of cities 603 248 190
Population 165,885 217,305 238,085
(410,156) (585,338) (663,676)
% White 68.70% 69.04% 69.06%
(18.60) (18.85) (19.25)
Unemployment 6.43% 6.29% 6.25%
(2.69) (2.53) (2.52)
Median HH income $43,666.75 $43,727.29 $43,832.77
(13,657.94) (13,584.26) (13,638.49)
Home ownership 58.45% 58.44% 58.63%
(12.47) (11.46) (11.55)
Median house value $143,319 $142,023 $139,848
(87,567.82) (78,348.31) (75,097.68)
Note: Descriptive statistics from the 2000 U.S. Census.
data, I coded candidates’ experience in a variety of political and occupational categories.7 In-
dicators of political experience include incumbency and prior experience as mayor, city council
member, county legislator, state legislator, and member of Congress. Occupational categories
include business owners and executives, non-executive business occupations, other white collar
occupations (such as healthcare professionals and educators), public sector employment, and blue
collar occupations.8 I also coded whether candidates are involved in specific sectors, such as real
estate and development and banking and investments.
The resulting dataset includes the race, gender, political experience, and occupational back-
grounds of 3,257 mayoral candidates. However, some candidates’ background information is
7This paper relies on data collected through December 30, 2016, and data collection is ongoing.
8With respect to the distinction between executive and non-executive business occupations, as coded, business
owner/executives are individuals described as owners, co-owners, or executive officers (president, vice-president, etc.)
of a business or firm engaged in the provision of goods and/or services for profit.
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missing or incomplete, so much of the discussion here focuses on a subset of the sample, which
includes the top two candidates in 1,217 elections for which I have the most complete data. This
subset includes elections and candidates from 248 US cities in 44 states over the time period of
1950 to 2007. Table 4.2 summarizes political experience and demographic attributes of candidates
and mayors. Overall, the data suggest that mayors are not very diverse in terms of race, ethnicity
and gender. Nearly 11% of mayors are women, and 5.5% of mayors are African-American. His-
panic mayors make up 2.6% of the sample, and only 0.7% of mayors are Asian-American. Turning
to political experience, we see that about half of the mayors in the sample served on the city council
prior to their election and about 45% were reelected as incumbents. Few mayors have experience
at higher levels of government, and exceptions tend to occur in large cities or where a politician
can serve in multiple offices at once. For example, mayors from both New York (John Lindsay, Ed
Koch) and Los Angeles (Norris Poulson, Sam Yorty) served in Congress prior to their election.
Along with political experience and demographic attributes, occupational experience of can-
didates provides more detailed information about the mayors that preside over American cities.
Although mayoral candidates are drawn from somewhat diverse occupational fields, notably, the
most common occupations are white-collar professions. Table 4.3 shows the distribution of com-
mon occupations among mayoral candidates. First, we can note that the distribution of occupations
is quite similar for both mayors and runners-up. Business owners and executives account for about
32% of mayors. About 20% are attorneys, and about 13% of these have experience as a prosecutor
or city attorney. About 8% of mayors are public sector workers, including city, county, state, and
federal employees. Other common occupations include manager or supervisor, educator, health-
care and other professionals, administrator, and homemaker. The majority of educators are school
teachers, and the other professional category is dominated by engineers and accountants, along
with several architects and urban planners. Most of the administrators work in either education or
the nonprofit sector. Among the occupational outliers are a florist and a baseball scout.9 Although
9James L. Maxwell worked as a florist before serving as mayor of Tulsa, OK from 1958 to 1966. Charles L.
Babcock, mayor of Canton, OH from 1958 to 1961 worked as a baseball scout for the Cleveland Indians prior to his
election.
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Table 4.2: Experience & Attributes
Mayors Runners-up
Count Share Count Share
Race & Ethnicity
White 1110 91.2% 1117 91.2%
Black 67 5.5% 63 5.2%
Hispanic 32 2.6% 30 2.5%
Asian 8 0.7% 7 0.6%
Gender
Male 1088 89.4% 1086 89.2%
Female 129 10.6% 131 10.8%
Political Experience
No Experience 250 20.6% 433 35.7%
City Council 638 52.4% 560 46.0%
Mayor 606 50.1% 322 26.8%
Incumbent 546 45.2% 239 19.9%
State Legislator 111 9.1% 83 6.8%
County Legislator 34 2.8% 37 3.0%
US Legislator 15 1.2% 9 0.7%
n = 2434
Note: The table provides details on the political experience and attributes of mayors and mayoral candidates. Some mayors have
multiple types of prior political experience, so the sum of the share of candidates with all types of experience exceeds 100%.
we might tend to think of business owners as Republicans, there are a fair share of Democrats.
Among candidates where a party affiliation is observed, more than 41% are Democrats while about
50% are Republicans.
Candidates and mayors with business executive experience are individuals described as owners
or corporate officers (CEO, COO, president, vice-president, treasurer, etc.) of a business or firm
engaged in the sale or provision of goods or services for profit. Among the business executive
mayors, several, including Michael Bloomberg, ran large businesses. For example, the so-called
“Onion King,” Othal Brand, who was mayor of McAllen, Texas for 20 years, was also co-founder
and chairman of Griffin & Brand, Incorporated, a produce processing company and one of the
world’s largest onion producers (Bell and Pipitone 2009). John M. Belk, four-term mayor of
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Table 4.3: Occupational Backgrounds
Mayors Runners-up
Occupation Count Share Count Share
Business owner/executive 386 31.7% 397 32.6%
Attorney 240 19.7% 203 16.7%
Public Employee 96 7.9% 114 9.4%
Sales 75 6.2% 70 5.8%
Manager/supervisor 69 5.7% 61 5.0%
Educator 66 5.4% 55 4.5%
Administrator 39 3.2% 40 3.3%
Other professional 33 2.7% 38 3.1%
Homemaker 20 1.6% 24 2.0%
Healthcare professional 18 1.5% 15 1.2%
Other occupations 175 14.4% 200 16.4%
n = 2434
Note: The table provides details on the occupational experience of mayors and mayoral candidates. The occupations included
above are the most common among candidates and mayors in the sample.
Charlotte, North Carolina, was the president and CEO of the Belk family’s chain of department
stores (Belk n.d.). However, many candidates with executive business experience own or run much
smaller local businesses. Common examples include restaurants and food service businesses, real
estate and development firms, insurance agencies, and a number of funeral homes. Among the
more unusual businesses are a seed company, a firm that specializes in designing ice rinks, and a
cheese factory.
To test whether electing a business executive mayor produces systematically different fiscal
outcomes, I augment city election results and candidates’ background data with public finance
data drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau. Together, the Census of Governments and the Annual
Survey of Governments provide detailed revenue and expenditure data for U.S. local governments
from 1951 to 2012.10 All dependent variables are measured in per-capita constant (2000) dollars
adjusted for differences in the cost of living across states per Berry, Fording and Hanson (2000).11
10The Census of Governments is conducted every five years, while the Annual Survey of Governments includes
only a sample of local governments.
11Results are substantively similar with or without use of cross-state cost of living index.
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From these sources, I first focus on total revenues and total expenditures, measures that capture the
size of government. Business executives tend to run on promises to increase efficiency, and they
are likely to prefer lower taxes. If business executive mayors fulfill their promises and pursue their
own policy preferences, we should expect to see systematic differences in key indicators of the
overall size of government. Yet, business executives are also likely to prefer quality services and
desirable amenities that can create a hospitable environment for commerce, so rather than cutting
spending, they may try to find alternative sources of revenue. Because of the expectation that
business executives prefer lower taxes and minimal redistribution, I also examine revenue sources,
such as total taxes and total user charges and miscellaneous revenue.
In addition to variables that capture the size of local government and distinguish between rev-
enue sources, I also consider whether and how electing a business executive affects spending in
various categories. If the goal of business owners and executives is to create a city that is hospitable
to commerce and promotes economic vitality, they may be likely to prioritize spending on services
and amenities that could attract businesses and residents. These could include essential services,
such as public safety, or local infrastructure and amenities. At the same time, business owners and
executives should be likely to avoid spending in redistributive policy areas. Fuchs (1992) empha-
sizes that budgeting is a highly political process, in which mayors play a central role. As a result,
the allocation of resources across spending categories effectively reflects local leaders’ policy pri-
orities. Per-capita spending levels across policy areas reflect the compromises and tradeoffs of
municipal budgeting.12
12In contrast to many prior studies (see e.g., Ferreira and Gyourko 2009, 2014; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Hajnal
2010; Hopkins and McCabe 2012; Peterson 1981), I use absolute per-capita spending to measure fiscal policy priorities
rather than spending shares . Much like spending shares, absolute spending levels capture the outcome of budget
negotiation and allow for straightforward interpretation of results. The results do not depend on this operationalization,
and Section A.3 of the Appendix do include an analysis of spending shares.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Size of Government
In this section, I present the results of a regression discontinuity analysis of the effect of electing a
mayor with executive business experience on the size of local government. I examine how business
executive mayors affect total expenditures and total revenue, as well as total taxes and total charges
and miscellaneous revenue. As described above, the RDD leverages variation in election outcomes
that plausibly can be attributed to chance. As long as candidates are unable to precisely manipulate
their vote shares, the outcomes of close elections are as-if random—akin to random assignment of
treatment in an experimental design. Here, the treatment of interest is a business executive mayor,
and intuitively, we would expect cities that barely do or do not elect a business executive are quite
similar in observed and unobserved factors related to the propensity to elect a business executive.
As a result, the RDD mitigates the threat of potential confounders that could bias the results.
However, it is important to note that RDDs produce estimates of local average treatment effects,
that is the effect of narrowly electing a business executive mayor.
Figure 4.1 includes graphs that plot key dependent variables against the rating variable, which
is the business executive candidate’s vote-share margin. Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present esti-
mates of the effect of electing a business executive mayor on several dependent variables related to
the size of government, including total expenditures, total revenues, total taxes, and total charges
and miscellaneous revenue. Partly for ease of interpretation, I operationalize fiscal outcomes in
per-capita constant dollars, but using logged or differenced dependent variables yields consistent
results (see the Appendix for details of these analyses). The results in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6
include estimates from local linear regression models using a bandwidth of 0.05 (models 2 and 4)
as well as the optimal bandwidth (models 1 and 3).
Although the as-if random treatment assignment in close elections implies that covariates are
not necessary to produce unbiased estimates, the use of pre-treatment covariates can improve pre-
cision (Lee and Lemieux 2010; Calonico et al. 2016). In Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, models 1 and 2
include only an indicator for a business executive mayor, the business executive’s margin, and the
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interaction of the two. Models 3 and 4 add several pre-treatment covariates as well as the value
of the dependent variable the year before the election. The covariate-adjusted models account
for city-level characteristics, such as population, racial composition, median household income,
and median house value, that may be correlated with fiscal outcomes. In particular, population
tends to be systematically related to cities’ functional obligations and thus the size of government
while a city’s lagged spending and revenues are strong predictors of outcomes in subsequent years.
These pre-treatment covariates tend to improve the precision of point estimates considerably, but
the substantive results of the covariate-adjusted models do not hinge on the inclusion of additional
city-level variables. In comparison, the unadjusted models generally produce larger but noisier
estimates.13
Figure 4.1 (a) addresses total expenditures, with the business executive margin on the x-axis
and total expenditures (per-capita ) on the y-axis. The points represent binned averages of per-
capita total expenditures (bin width is 0.02). The vertical line marks the threshold in the rating
variable, and loess lines plot the relationship between total expenditures and business executive
vote-share margin. Note that the rating variable is centered at 0, so the points on the left side
of the threshold—negative values of the rating variable—indicate expenditures in cities where the
business executive lost while points on the right reflect expenditures in cities that elected a business
executive. The graph shows a jump of about $700.00 in total expenditures at the threshold. The
results presented in Table 4.4 provide some support for an increase in total expenditures, with
point estimates ranging from $103 in a covariate-adjusted local linear regression model with a 5%
bandwidth to $857 in an unadjusted model. However, none of the estimates approach statistical
significance.
Figure 4.1 (b) plots total revenue with business executive margin on the x-axis and per-capita
total revenue on the y-axis. In this graph, we observe a similar but smaller increase in total revenue
at the cutpoint, which is consistent with the results presented in Table 4.4. The effect of electing
13Another option for improving the precisions of the RD estimates is to operationalize the dependent variables as
the difference between the values at t + 2 and t − 1. The Appendix contains these results, as well as specifications
with logged dependent variables.
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Note: Each graph plots the relationship between the dependent variable and the rating variable. The x-axis is business executive
vote-share margin, and the y-axis is the value of the dependent variable in dollars per capita. Points are binned averages.
a business executive mayor ranges from a $109 to $650 per-capita increase in spending, but these
estimates also fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Table 4.4 shows a similar
pattern for total debt—positive but not statistically significant point estimates ranging from $245
to $404.
Although electing a business executive mayor appears to have little effect on the overall size of
government, further analyses yield some suggestive evidence of other changes in fiscal outcomes.
Table 4.5 presents RD results similar to those described above but focuses on sources of municipal
revenue. These results indicate that business executive mayors have little if any effect on taxes
but may still preside over an increase in revenue raised from local sources. Covariate-adjusted
models yield positive point estimates of $152 to $158 per capita, and these results are marginally
statistically significant. A closer look at Table 4.5 provides a hint as to one possible source of this
revenue increase. The results include an increase in charges and miscellaneous revenue with point
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Table 4.4: Effect of Electing a Business Executive on Size of Government
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Expenditures 1,506.89 532.35 856.72 135.42 102.56
(1,053.30) (373.63) (548.11) (107.14) (158.14)
Bandwidth 0.099 0.050 0.093 0.050
Observations 266 151 236 143
Total Revenues 1,495.28 400.29 649.83 124.05 108.54
(995.39) (334.30) (454.73) (101.62) (108.81)
Bandwidth 0.092 0.050 0.066 0.050
Observations 251 151 184 143
Total Debt 1,765.33 245.03 404.17 279.79 374.27
(1,478.05) (542.59) (731.95) (547.65) (754.69)
Bandwidth 0.082 0.050 0.084 0.050
Observations 227 151 214 143
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Note: The table presents results of local linear regression models with robust standard errors. Models 1 and 2 include the treatment
variable, forcing variable, and the interaction of the two. Models 2 and 4 add pre-treatment covariates. Models 2 and 4 use a
bandwidth of 0.05 while models 1 and 3 use the optimal bandwidth calculated per Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (noted
for each dependent variable). All dependent variables are measured in constant per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
estimates ranging from $56 to $178 depending on the specification. Results from the covariate-
adjusted models approach—but fall just short of— conventional levels of statistical significance
(in models 3 and 4, p = 0.131 and p = 0.106, respectively). Indeed, in some specifications, the
increase in charges and miscellaneous revenue is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Overall, the results presented above provide no evidence to suggest that electing a business
executive leads to lower total revenues or expenditures, but these results are consistent with the
notion that business executives would prefer to limit taxes while maintaining municipal services
and amenities. Indeed, we find some indications that business executives may increase expendi-
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Table 4.5: Effect of Electing a Business Executive on Municipal Revenue
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Own-source 1,169.35 196.35 361.58 151.64∗ 158.45∗
Revenues (748.06) (222.21) (277.90) (80.83) (83.75)
Bandwidth 0.081 0.050 0.056 0.050
Observations 222 151 154 143
Total Taxes 556.18 110.75 195.85 −11.97 −12.29
(383.23) (102.81) (126.29) (35.72) (47.97)
Bandwidth 0.093 0.050 0.083 0.050
Observations 252 151 213 143
Property Taxes 371.26 197.44∗∗ 278.41∗∗∗ 14.37 22.38
(357.42) (88.13) (106.54) (31.31) (38.13)
Bandwidth 0.080 0.050 0.074 0.050
Observations 219 151 198 143
Sales Taxes 126.95 −40.74 −45.35 1.94 1.27
(132.27) (32.31) (35.86) (9.23) (9.27)
Bandwidth 0.073 0.050 0.053 0.050
Observations 210 151 148 143
Charges & Misc. 315.62 108.54 177.72 56.04 62.60
Revenue (261.18) (100.78) (127.24) (36.93) (38.52)
Bandwidth 0.071 0.050 0.057 0.050
Observations 207 151 155 143
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Note: The table presents results of local linear regression models with robust standard errors. Models 1 and 2 include the treatment
variable, forcing variable, and the interaction of the two. Models 2 and 4 add pre-treatment covariates. Models 2 and 4 use a
bandwidth of 0.05 while models 1 and 3 use the optimal bandwidth calculated per Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (noted
for each dependent variable). All dependent variables are measured in constant per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
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Table 4.6: Effect of Electing a Business Executive on Municipal Debt
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt Issued 251.45 208.69 212.66 142.34 94.64
(370.93) (149.25) (201.01) (108.33) (123.65)
Bandwidth 0.083 0.050 0.074 0.050
Observations 229 151 198 143
Short-term Debt 60.68 35.28 86.05∗ 47.97 58.96∗
(194.71) (46.06) (45.92) (31.51) (33.67)
Bandwidth 0.080 0.050 0.062 0.050
Observations 220 151 167 143
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Note: The table presents results of local linear regression models with robust standard errors. Models 1 and 2 include the treatment
variable, forcing variable, and the interaction of the two. Models 2 and 4 add pre-treatment covariates. Models 2 and 4 use a
bandwidth of 0.05 while models 1 and 3 use the optimal bandwidth calculated per Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (noted
for each dependent variable). All dependent variables are measured in constant per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
tures and revenues. Total own-source revenue is higher by about $158 per-capita. Any boost in
cities’ own-source revenue, however, appears likely to come from charges and miscellaneous in-
come rather than taxes. Notably, these results also provide some suggestive evidence that business
executive mayors increase debt—-in particular, short term debt. Used to cover operating expenses
in anticipation of future revenue, higher levels of short-term debt could reflect a distinctive ap-
proach to financial management, but greater outstanding short-term debt also could be an indicator
of fiscal strain (see e.g., Fuchs 1992). Although the results presented in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 fall
short of providing conclusive evidence, they do yield the first hint that business executive mayors
might influence fiscal outcomes.
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4.4.2 Spending
The analysis above indicates that business executive mayors do not have a major impact on the
size of government. However, given business leaders’ preferences for policies that create a hos-
pitable environment for commerce, increase property values, and limit redistribution, mayors with
experience as business owners or executives could influence how local resources are allocated. In
this section, I consider whether and how electing a business executive mayor affects spending in
a variety of categories. The analysis incorporates a number of dependent variables that measure
expenditures allocated to key local spending categories (Financial Administration and General
Control, Fire Protection, Health, Highways, Housing and Community Development, Libraries,
Parks and Recreation, Police Protection, and Sanitation, and Welfare). The RDD results suggest
that business executive mayors do influence cities’ spending priorities.
Figure 4.3 depicts RDD estimates of the effect of narrowly electing a business executive mayor
on per-capita city expenditures in multiple spending categories. Note that spending categories are
grouped into three classes—allocational, developmental, and redistributive—reflecting the policy
typology formulated by Peterson (1981). The horizontal axis denotes the size of the effect in
dollars per capita, and the vertical axis lists each dependent variable. The dots indicate point esti-
mates, and the solid bars span 90% confidence intervals while the dashed lines extend to show the
95% confidence intervals. All of the results reported in Figure 4.3 reflect estimates from covariate-
adjusted local linear regressions with a bandwith of 0.05. The specifications are comparable to
those presented in Table Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 above and include several covariates (population,
racial composition, median household income, and median house value, and the lagged depen-
dent variable). The Appendix provides additional details of these results as well as alternative
specifications.
The results presented in Figure 4.3 are largely consistent with policy choices we would expect
from business owners and executives. Indeed, we observe a significant decrease in spending on
housing and community development, which can include spending on public housing, as well as
economic development projects, community centers, homeowner assistance, and other initiatives
to assist low-income residents. Along with health expenditures, and housing and community de-
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Note: Each graph plots the relationship between the dependent variable and the rating variable. The x-axis is business executive
vote-share margin, and the y-axis is the value of the dependent variable in dollars per capita. Points are binned averages.
velopment spending is typically redistributive in nature (Peterson 1981; Hajnal 2010). Electing
a business executive mayor leads to a decrease of $27 per capita in total spending allocated to
housing and community development (standard error = 11.551, p-value = 0.021), and this result is
robust across a range of alternative specifications. Electing a business executive mayor appears to
have no meaningful effect on health or welfare spending, yet expenditures in these categories also
are quite small relative to spending in other policy areas (in the sample, the mean total expenditures
allocated to health is $21 per capita and mean spending on welfare is $22 per capita, compared to
$52 per-capita for housing).
While business executive mayors are associated with lower levels of spending on housing and
community development, the results suggest that business executive mayors may prioritize spend-
ing on developmental initiatives such as roads and parks. Spending on highways and roads can
improve transportation and accessibility, attracting residents and businesses and generating eco-
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Note: Figure 4.3 presents results of covariate-adjusted local linear regressions using bandwidth of 0.05 to estimate the effect
of electing a business executive mayor on per-capita spending. The horizontal axis denotes the effect size in dollars per capita,
and the vertical axis lists the dependent variables. The dots represent point estimates, and the bars illustrate robust confidence
intervals. Additional details are included in the Appendix.
nomic benefits while parks and recreation can provide amenities that make a community more
attractive, perhaps even contributing to a stronger tax base (Peterson 1981).14 The effect of a busi-
ness executive mayor is an increase of $90 in per-capita expenditures allocated to roads (standard
error = 43.257, p-value = 0.039). Electing a business executive may also lead to an increase in
per-capita spending on parks and recreation. The estimate of about $54 per capita is statistically
14Peterson (1981) classifies spending on highways and roads as clearly developmental, while he suggests that parks
may be allocational but could also be considered developmental to the extent that they make a locality more attractive
to high-income taxpayers. Following the same rationale, I also classify spending on libraries as developmental.
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significant at the 10% level (standard error = 30.583, p-value = 0.079). The results for parks, how-
ever, are somewhat sensitive to the choice of specification (see the Appendix for details). Yet, sim-
ilar results provide quite consistent evidence that electing a business executive leads to increased
spending directed to roads.
The remaining spending categories represent essential or so-called “housekeeping” services,
including public safety, sanitation, and administration. For the most part, the results imply that
electing a business executive mayor has little impact on the allocation of resources to such services.
The estimates of the effect on spending for public safety and solid waste management are quite
small in magnitude and are not statistically significant. The results do, however, suggest that
business executive mayors may be associated with a small increase in expenditures allocated to
spending on financial administration and general control. Electing a business executive mayor
leads to an $11 increase in per-capita administration expenditures, an estimate that is marginally
statistically significant
Overall, the results presented here suggest that narrowly electing a business executive mayor
leads to systematic changes in local fiscal policy. Despite campaign promises of increased effi-
ciency, I find no indication that business executive mayors reduce total expenditures or total rev-
enues. However, the RDD results provide strong and consistent evidence that business executive
mayors are associated with lower levels of spending allocated to housing and community develop-
ment. Moreover, the results of the spending analysis suggest that decreases in this redistributive
category are accompanied by increased expenditures on developmental policy areas, such as roads
and parks. These results are consistent with the notion that business executives prefer lower taxes
and limited redistribution along with high-quality services and amenities that can make a city at-
tractive to businesses and residents. The findings also comport with the hypothesis that business
executives will pursue policy preferences for restricting tax increases without compromising core
municipal services and amenities.
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4.4.3 The Role of Party
One potential concern about these results is the possibility that the effects of electing a business ex-
ecutive reflect mayors’ political party affiliations rather than their experience in business. Though
it is true that more business owners and executives in the sample are Republicans, many Democrats
also own or operate businesses. The key difficulties in addressing this concern are that party af-
filiation is unobserved for many mayors in the sample and that in some cases the candidates are
copartisans.
To investigate whether the RDD results do, in fact, reflect party, I focus on the subset of data in
which party is observed (and different) for the winning candidate and the runner-up. This approach
is admittedly imperfect, but it does suggest that the effect of electing a business executive mayor
is distinct from the effect of electing a Republican.15 Table 4.7 shows the RD estimates of electing
a business executive mayor on per-capita spending for both housing and roads in the subset of
cities where candidates’ party affiliations are known. These results are consistent with the analysis
above. The magnitude of the effect is larger for spending on roads, but I again find that business
executive mayors preside over lower per-capita spending on housing and higher levels of spending
on roads.
In addition to replicating my main findings, I also run a separate RD analysis to examine the
effects of electing a Republican mayor. The results, presented in Table 4.8, suggest that the effect
of electing a Republican is not the same—-or even similar to—-the effect electing a business
executive. Indeed, the sign of the coefficient on roads is reversed, and the estimate of the effect
on housing is neither substantively nor statistically significant. These results should be interpreted
with caution especially in light of the small number of observations. Taken together, however,
these analyses substantially mitigate concerns that the effects attributed to business executives
simply reflect the influence of political party.
15The Appendix includes additional results.
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Table 4.7: Effect of Electing a Business Executive
Elections With Candidates of Different Parties
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Roads 100.82 157.13∗∗ 147.37∗∗ 137.69∗∗ 147.16∗∗
(81.36) (68.73) (64.57) (58.71) (63.60)
Bandwidth 0.046 0.050 0.057 0.050
Observations 68 72 72 69
Housing 63.56 −40.42 −42.60 −39.14∗∗ −39.81∗∗
(80.10) (27.90) (27.73) (17.82) (18.49)
Bandwidth 0.053 0.050 0.055 0.050
Observations 72 70 71 68
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Note: The table presents results of local linear regression models with robust standard errors incorporating only the subset of data
where opposing candidates differ in party affiliation. Models 1 and 2 include the treatment variable, forcing variable (business
executive’s vote margin), and the interaction of the two. Models 2 and 4 add pre-treatment covariates. Models 2 and 4 use a
bandwidth of 0.05 while models 1 and 3 use the optimal bandwidth calculated per Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (noted
for each dependent variable). All dependent variables are measured in constant per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
4.5 Conclusion
In June, 2004, the city council of Wilmington, North Carolina, approved a $122 million budget that
included a property tax rate cut. At the time, city council member Katherine Moore “commended
the mayor [Spence Broadhurst] for putting together a budget that offers the citizens a tax break
without remarkable cuts in services or capital projects” (Gannon 2004). To offset the lost revenue,
the spending plan increased a range of fees and charges, including water and sewer fees, municipal
golf course fees, parking rates, and junk vehicle fees. Increasing municipal fees and charges is
hardly unusual. Indeed, the National League of Cities, in 2013, reported that “for much of the past
two decades, regardless of the state of national, regional, or local economies, the most common
action taken to boost city revenues has been to increase the amount of fees charged for services”
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Table 4.8: Effect of Electing a Republican
Elections With Candidates of Different Parties
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Roads 100.82 −76.94 −82.48 −86.30 −102.32∗
(81.36) (65.92) (69.22) (53.34) (61.13)
Bandwidth 0.054 0.050 0.063 0.050
Observations 74 72 78 69
Housing 63.56 42.92 44.44 −3.29 −2.56
(80.10) (28.90) (29.57) (16.12) (16.44)
Bandwidth 0.071 0.050 0.053 0.050
Observations 87 70 69 68
Covariates No No Yes Yes
Note: The table presents results of local linear regression models with robust standard errors incorporating only the subset of data
where opposing candidates differ in party affiliation. Models 1 and 2 include the treatment variable, forcing variable (Republican’s
vote margin), and the interaction of the two. Models 2 and 4 add pre-treatment covariates. Models 2 and 4 use a bandwidth of
0.05 while models 1 and 3 use the optimal bandwidth calculated per Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (noted for each
dependent variable). All dependent variables are measured in constant per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
(Pagano and Hoene 2008). A tradeoff between fees and taxes may be less common, although
Matsusaka (2004) finds that direct democracy, at both the state and city levels, is associated with a
similar shift in revenue sources—from taxes to user fees and charges. The analysis presented here
provides some suggestive evidence that mayors with executive business experience also may be
more likely to shape policies that resemble those of Wilmington, decreasing or maintaining local
taxes and increasing municipal fees and charges to bolster revenues from local sources.
With original data on mayoral candidates backgrounds, this paper sheds new light on the may-
ors who serve in America’s city halls. These data reveal that mayors are not a very diverse group.
They tend to be white and male with white-collar occupations. Business executives are especially
well represented, accounting for about 30% of mayors in a sample of 248 U.S. cities. Leverag-
ing the “as-if random” treatment assignment that arises from close elections, this study estimates
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the causal effect of narrowly electing a mayor with executive business experience on a number
of local fiscal outcomes. I find that business executive mayors do not cut total revenues or total
expenditures. Business executive mayors do, however, preside over systematic changes in spend-
ing priorities. Electing a business executive mayor leads to a lower levels of spending allocated to
housing and community development and greater city spending on roads.
As we might expect given the formal and informal constraints they face, business executive
mayors do not dramatically influence the overall size of local government. Yet, like political
leaders in other contexts, mayors with executive business experience do shape municipal fiscal
policy in important and measurable ways by shifting spending priorities. These policy changes
have implications for the distribution of both costs and benefits of local government. To the extent
that cities increase their reliance on fees and charges and decrease spending on housing programs,
they limit the potential for redistribution. Although allocating additional funds to roads and parks
may benefit citizens broadly, cuts to housing and community development likely affect poorer
residents disproportionately. These findings also raise questions for future research.
Electing a business owner or executive to the office of mayor leads to changes in fiscal pol-
icy consistent with the types of policy choices that Peterson (1981) suggests are necessary to at-
tract businesses and high-income taxpayers. Such policies should promote economic vitality and
strengthen the local tax base. Future research might examine the downstream effects of business
executive mayors. Is there evidence of greater economic growth or a stronger tax base? What are
the implications of these policy changes for low-income residents? Some survey evidence indi-
cates that at the local level, the public prefers service-based charges to taxes (Matsusaka 2004). At
the same time, reliance on revenue from fees and charges as opposed to taxes also may have impli-
cations for fiscal management and health because restrictions on the use of fee-based revenue may
limit local leaders discretion and flexibility in managing a city’s fiscal affairs and exacerbate fiscal
challenges (Erie, Kogan and MacKenzie 2011). Is there a link between who serves as mayor and
cities’ fiscal health? Finally, this study challenges the notion that local leaders and local politics
are largely inconsequential and should encourage researchers to further consider how the leaders
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A.1 Sample Demographics
Table A.1: Demographic Characteristics of Experimental Samples
Respondent Race
White Black Hispanic Other
mTurk 0.787 0.066 0.045 0.102






Liberal Conservative Moderate Other
mTurk 0.444 0.232 0.273 0.051
YouGov 0.204 0.354 0.351 0.091
Respondent Party Identification
Democrat Independent Republican
mTurk 0.581 0.164 0.254
YouGov 0.385 0.270 0.346
Respondent Education
Less than high school High School / GED Some College Four-Year College Graduate School
mTurk 0.005 0.092 0.359 0.403 0.141
YouGov 0.121 0.306 0.318 0.164 0.091
Respondent Age
18 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 or over
mTurk 0.459 0.274 0.122 0.093 0.051
YouGov 0.209 0.163 0.150 0.149 0.328
Cell entries are sample proportions.
YouGov entries calculated using sample weights.
MTurk N: 1,204; YouGov N: 1,200.
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A.2 Generalizability
In this section, we explore the extent to which the experimental results obtained on MTurk general-
ize to the U.S. adult population. Whether or not a causal effect estimate from one study generalizes
to another (real or hypothetical) study depends on the similarities in the subjects, treatments, con-
texts, and outcome measures of each study (Cronbach, Shapiro and Others 1982; Coppock and
Green 2015). In our case, the treatments (candidate attributes), contexts (online survey), and out-
come measures (candidate preference) were held constant by design. The experimental feature that
might undermine our ability to generalize from the MTurk study to other populations is the plain
fact that the MTurk sample differs in many ways from the national population.
The crucial question, then, concerns treatment effect heterogeneity. Do subjects on MTurk
weigh the experimentally-manipulated candidate attributes differently from others? Conducting
the same study on each platform allows us to answer this question directly. We will compare the
coefficients in Equations 1 and 2 across samples. Effectively, the data for this comparison are the
coefficients presented in the first two columns of Figures A.2 and A.3. A first cut at assessing
generalizablity is the Pearson correlation between the coefficients estimated from each sample,
which is estimated to be 0.95. This correlation is extraordinarily high, despite being attenuated by
measurement error. The Spearman (rank-order) correlation is also quite high, at 0.80.
The coefficient estimates themselves are plotted in Figure A.1, with the MTurk estimates on the
horizontal axis and the YouGov estimates on the vertical axis. Coefficients from the nonpartisan
elections are plotted with open points, while the partisan coefficients are filled. The plot shows two
bivariate regression lines, one for the partisan elections and a second for the nonpartisan elections.
The slopes for partisan and nonpartisan elections barely differ, indicating that both sets of results
appear to generalize. Finally, the figure emphasizes our main finding. The effects of political
experience (shown in the shaded gray box) are stronger in nonpartisan elections than in partisan
elections. This finding obtains in both samples.
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Figure A.1: Comparison of MTurk and YouGov Estimates
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A.3 Mechanisms
In the main text, we suggested that a principle mechanism by which nonpartisan elections change
who voters prefer is the additional weight that voters may give to candidate competence when the
party label is absent. In this appendix, we further explore this possibility as well as the alternative
mechanisms of perceived ideology and satisficing.
A.3.1 Perceived Candidate Competence
In Figures 6 and 7 of the main text, we reported estimates of the heterogeneous effects of treatment
by part on the “competence” dependent variable. This question asked respondents: “On a scale
from 0 to 100, how competent do you think these candidates would be as mayor?” In this section,
we report the average (not broken down by party) effects of treatment. These figures are analogous
to figures 1 and 2 from the main text. The results are very similar, but we present them here for
completeness. On MTurk and YouGov, subjects rate politically experienced candidates as more
competent. In both studies, this effect is stronger in nonpartisan elections, though these differences
are only statistically significant on MTurk. This analysis provides additional credence to the notion
that voters prefer more experienced candidates in nonpartisan elections because they view them as
more competent. Again, we do not view this analysis as ruling out other possible mechanisms, one
of which we will explore in the next section.
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Figure A.2: Mechanical Turk Main Analysis
Dependent Variable: Competence
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Figure A.3: YouGov Main Analysis
Dependent Variable: Competence
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In addition to vote choice and competence, we also asked respondents to rate how likely each
candidate would be to implement specific policies or objectives. Subjects were randomly asked
“How likely do you think each candidate would be to [keep taxes low / balance the budget?]”
Response options ranged from 1 (Very unlikely) to 7 (Very likely). For the purpose of this analysis,
we will pool responses to these valence questions as an alternative measure of competence. We
think that, regardless of party, respondents would give higher values to candidates they view as
more competent on these issues.
Figures A.4 and A.5 present the results of our analysis using the valence performance measure
as the dependent variable and splitting the sample based on respondents’ partisanship. As we
might expect, respondents view candidates of their own party as more likely to balance the budget
or reduce crime. Both Democratic and Republican respondents (in both studies) rate those with
more political and career experience higher on these issues. If we turn to the difference panels,
we see some suggestive evidence that the political and career attributes are given better scores
in nonpartisan elections than in partisan elections. Some differences by respondent partisanship
emerge in the YouGov sample in line with our previous results: Republicans appear to give career
experience greater weight in nonpartisan elections and Democrats give greater weight to political
experience in nonpartisan elections.
A.3.2 Perceived Candidate Ideology
As noted above and in the main text, we think that there are likely a large number of mechanisms
by which nonpartisan electoral rules influence vote choice. Perceptions of candidate competence is
one; perceptions of their ideology is another. To gain insight into this question, we asked respon-
dents to predict how each candidate would handle one relatively conservative policy option and
one relatively liberal policy option The questions were randomly chosen from two possibilities in
each category as shown in Table A.2. We rescale and combine these policy questions to create an
index of perceived candidate ideology where lower values are more liberal and higher values are
more conservative.
Figures A.6 and A.7 report the results of an analysis of our perceived candidate ideology in-
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Figure A.4: Mechanical Turk Heterogeneous Effects Analysis
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Figure A.5: YouGov Heterogeneous Effects Analysis
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Table A.2: Policy Questions
How likely do you think each candidate would be to...
Liberal
manage growth to protect the environment?




keep taxes low without compromising munici-
pal services?
Response options range from 1 (Very unlikely) to 7 (Very likely).
dex. These results indicate that occupation in particular influences respondents’ evaluations of
how likely a candidate is to implement conservative or liberal policies. Relative to educators,
respondents of both parties rate business owners and executives as especially likely to produce
conservative policies. The “Difference” column of facets in each figure provide some evidence
that this inference is more pronounced in nonpartisan elections, at least for Democrats.
We note that race, gender, and age also seem to influence respondents’ assessments. For ex-
ample, Democrats view older candidates as more conservative on policy while Republicans view
nonwhite candidates and women as more liberal. Although Democrats do place more weight on
age in nonpartisan elections, we find few systematic differences to suggest that most of these at-
tributes are more consequential in nonpartisan contexts. Perhaps surprisingly, political experience
had little to no effect on perceptions of candidate ideology, suggesting that perhaps perceived ide-
ology is not the main mechanism behind the political experience effects we observed for the main
dependent variable.
A.3.3 Satisficing
In the main text, we showed that in nonpartisan elections, voters weigh the political experience of
candidates more heavily. However, our experimental design leaves open an alternative explanation:
the smaller coefficients on the political experience attributes in the partisan elections may be an
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Figure A.6: Mechanical Turk Heterogeneous Effects Analysis
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Figure A.7: YouGov Heterogeneous Effects Analysis (Partisan Issues)
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artifact of satisficing. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2015) describe a “satisficing/masking
tradeoff” in conjoint experiments. Masking occurs when subjects use the revealed candidate at-
tributes to infer something about an unrevealed attribute. Satisficing occurs when subjects fail to
incorporate all the available information to them, and instead make their decision based on some
subset of the available attributes. All else equal, increasing the number of attributes alleviates the
masking problem but exacerbates the satificing problem.
In our application, subjects evaluate candidates on five attributes in the nonpartisan elections
and on six attributes in the partisan elections. We are concerned that the significant interaction
effect we find for the political experience variables may be due to the mechanical relationship with
the number of attributes.
To show that satisficing is not the driver of this interaction effect, we need to exploit a situation
in which the number of attributes stays constant, but we vary whether the election is “partisan” or
not. Our experiment provides such a situation. In some elections, the party of the two candidates
is different, but in others, the candidates are from the same party. If our claim that in the absence
of party cues, voters rely on political experience more heavily is correct, then we should see more
weight being given to political experience when the two candidates are from the same party than
when they are from different parties.
Figures A.8 and A.9 show our results, for the MTurk and YouGov samples, respectively. On
MTurk, we observe a statistically significant interaction: the effects for the political experience
attribute are stronger when candidates are from the same party. On YouGov, the effect of political
experience does not vary across the two types of elections.
We conclude from this analysis that while satisficing remains a concern, there is some evidence
that the greater weight placed on political experience in “nonpartisan” contests occurs in these
elections as well.
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Figure A.8: Mechanical Turk Partisan Choice
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Figure A.9: YouGov Partisan Choice
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A.4 Regression tables corresponding to all figures




Representative in Congress 0.25 (0.02)* 0.16 (0.02)* 0.09 (0.03)*
Mayor 0.32 (0.02)* 0.20 (0.02)* 0.12 (0.03)*
State Legislator 0.25 (0.02)* 0.16 (0.02)* 0.09 (0.03)*
City Council Member 0.23 (0.02)* 0.14 (0.02)* 0.09 (0.03)*
Attorney -0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03)
Business Executive -0.04 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03)
Small Business Owner 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
Police Officer -0.05 (0.02)* -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03)
Asian 0.05 (0.02)* 0.00 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
Black 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03)
Hispanic 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
65 -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
55 0.02 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)* -0.02 (0.03)
45 0.05 (0.02)* 0.04 (0.02)* 0.01 (0.03)
Male -0.05 (0.01)* -0.03 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.02)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress 0.22 (0.03)* 0.11 (0.03)* 0.11 (0.04)*
Mayor 0.25 (0.03)* 0.15 (0.03)* 0.10 (0.05)*
State Legislator 0.18 (0.03)* 0.11 (0.03)* 0.07 (0.05)
City Council Member 0.21 (0.03)* 0.13 (0.04)* 0.09 (0.05)
School Board President 0.12 (0.03)* 0.09 (0.04)* 0.04 (0.05)
Attorney -0.01 (0.03) -0.10 (0.03)* 0.09 (0.05)
Business Executive 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.05)
Small Business Owner 0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) 0.09 (0.05)
Police Officer -0.00 (0.04) -0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.05)
Electrician -0.10 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.03)* -0.00 (0.05)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom -0.11 (0.03)* -0.11 (0.03)* 0.00 (0.05)
Asian -0.06 (0.03)* 0.01 (0.03) -0.07 (0.04)
Black -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
Hispanic -0.05 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04)
65 -0.05 (0.02) -0.06 (0.03)* 0.01 (0.04)
55 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.04)
45 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
Male -0.04 (0.02)* -0.04 (0.02)* 0.01 (0.03)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress 0.30 (0.03)* 0.14 (0.03)* 0.16 (0.04)*
Mayor 0.35 (0.02)* 0.18 (0.02)* 0.16 (0.03)*
State Legislator 0.29 (0.03)* 0.18 (0.02)* 0.11 (0.03)*
City Council Member 0.24 (0.03)* 0.14 (0.03)* 0.09 (0.04)*
Attorney -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04)
Business Executive -0.08 (0.03)* -0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03)
Small Business Owner -0.03 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04)
Police Officer -0.11 (0.03)* -0.05 (0.03)* -0.06 (0.04)
Asian 0.04 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
Black 0.06 (0.02)* 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
Hispanic 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03)
65 -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03)
55 0.01 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
45 0.05 (0.02)* 0.05 (0.02)* 0.00 (0.03)




Representative in Congress 0.17 (0.04)* 0.21 (0.04)* -0.04 (0.06)
Mayor 0.23 (0.04)* 0.26 (0.04)* -0.03 (0.05)
State Legislator 0.14 (0.04)* 0.16 (0.04)* -0.01 (0.06)
City Council Member 0.19 (0.04)* 0.15 (0.04)* 0.04 (0.05)
Attorney 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) -0.00 (0.06)
Business Executive 0.08 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.06 (0.06)
Small Business Owner 0.12 (0.04)* 0.11 (0.04)* 0.01 (0.06)
Police Officer 0.06 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05)
Asian 0.06 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.06 (0.05)
Black -0.10 (0.04)* 0.01 (0.04) -0.11 (0.05)*
Hispanic -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) -0.00 (0.05)
65 -0.01 (0.04) 0.08 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.05)
55 -0.00 (0.04) 0.10 (0.04)* -0.10 (0.05)*
45 0.03 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) -0.03 (0.05)
Male 0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress 0.23 (0.03)* 0.09 (0.03)* 0.14 (0.05)*
Mayor 0.29 (0.04)* 0.13 (0.03)* 0.16 (0.05)*
State Legislator 0.19 (0.04)* 0.08 (0.03)* 0.11 (0.05)*
City Council Member 0.21 (0.03)* 0.17 (0.03)* 0.05 (0.04)
School Board President 0.15 (0.03)* 0.09 (0.03)* 0.06 (0.05)
Attorney -0.07 (0.04) -0.10 (0.04)* 0.03 (0.05)
Business Executive -0.15 (0.04)* -0.05 (0.04) -0.09 (0.05)*
Small Business Owner -0.11 (0.04)* -0.07 (0.03)* -0.04 (0.05)
Police Officer -0.13 (0.04)* -0.09 (0.03)* -0.05 (0.05)
Electrician -0.19 (0.04)* -0.11 (0.04)* -0.08 (0.05)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom -0.21 (0.04)* -0.13 (0.04)* -0.07 (0.05)
Asian 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
Black 0.09 (0.03)* 0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04)
Hispanic 0.00 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04)
65 -0.06 (0.03)* -0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04)
55 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
45 -0.02 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.04)*




Representative in Congress 0.22 (0.04)* 0.17 (0.04)* 0.05 (0.05)
Mayor 0.22 (0.04)* 0.21 (0.04)* 0.01 (0.05)
State Legislator 0.22 (0.04)* 0.17 (0.04)* 0.04 (0.05)
City Council Member 0.15 (0.04)* 0.15 (0.04)* -0.00 (0.05)
School Board President 0.11 (0.04)* 0.12 (0.04)* -0.01 (0.05)
Attorney 0.08 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04) 0.13 (0.06)*
Business Executive 0.18 (0.04)* 0.10 (0.04)* 0.08 (0.06)
Small Business Owner 0.24 (0.04)* 0.00 (0.04) 0.23 (0.06)*
Police Officer 0.18 (0.04)* -0.01 (0.04) 0.19 (0.06)*
Electrician 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.06)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom -0.01 (0.04) -0.10 (0.04)* 0.09 (0.06)
Asian -0.06 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03)* 0.02 (0.04)
Black -0.07 (0.03)* -0.13 (0.03)* 0.06 (0.04)
Hispanic -0.09 (0.03)* -0.11 (0.03)* 0.01 (0.04)
65 -0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04)
55 -0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04)
45 0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04)
Male 0.04 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress 12.53 (1.08)* 8.31 (1.09)* 4.22 (1.52)*
Mayor 13.37 (1.04)* 7.82 (1.14)* 5.55 (1.48)*
State Legislator 10.21 (1.03)* 7.57 (1.06)* 2.63 (1.46)
City Council Member 9.85 (1.06)* 7.33 (1.05)* 2.52 (1.48)
Attorney 1.14 (1.06) -0.40 (0.99) 1.53 (1.41)
Business Executive -1.57 (1.07) -1.10 (0.97) -0.47 (1.41)
Small Business Owner -0.97 (1.03) 0.66 (0.96) -1.63 (1.41)
Police Officer -2.27 (1.18) -2.11 (1.00)* -0.16 (1.49)
Asian 0.57 (0.91) 2.53 (0.85)* -1.96 (1.20)
Black -0.55 (0.85) 2.49 (0.89)* -3.04 (1.20)*
Hispanic -0.85 (0.93) 1.90 (0.85)* -2.75 (1.19)*
65 1.57 (0.84) 1.23 (0.86) 0.34 (1.17)
55 1.16 (0.88) 1.86 (0.84)* -0.69 (1.20)
45 1.49 (0.87) 1.04 (0.86) 0.45 (1.22)




Representative in Congress 12.27 (1.67)* 9.29 (1.85)* 2.98 (2.38)
Mayor 12.76 (1.64)* 8.02 (1.86)* 4.74 (2.30)*
State Legislator 8.57 (1.83)* 7.73 (1.79)* 0.85 (2.52)
City Council Member 10.24 (1.66)* 6.93 (1.80)* 3.31 (2.49)
Attorney 2.13 (1.59) 2.31 (1.58) -0.18 (2.17)
Business Executive 4.89 (1.74)* 0.55 (1.70) 4.34 (2.32)
Small Business Owner 3.71 (1.62)* 3.20 (1.44)* 0.51 (2.20)
Police Officer 3.28 (1.54)* 0.45 (1.40) 2.83 (2.17)
Asian -1.47 (1.30) -1.77 (1.49) 0.30 (1.80)
Black -4.54 (1.33)* -1.37 (1.35) -3.17 (1.86)
Hispanic -3.91 (1.38)* -0.83 (1.25) -3.09 (1.79)
65 -1.91 (1.36) -0.15 (1.43) -1.76 (2.07)
55 0.19 (1.40) 1.39 (1.37) -1.20 (1.98)
45 0.65 (1.40) 1.39 (1.58) -0.75 (2.12)
Male 1.01 (1.07) 0.92 (0.87) 0.09 (1.37)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress 10.73 (1.70)* 7.12 (1.74)* 3.60 (2.33)
Mayor 12.51 (1.97)* 6.65 (1.77)* 5.86 (2.42)*
State Legislator 11.41 (1.69)* 6.22 (1.67)* 5.19 (2.25)*
City Council Member 11.38 (1.85)* 8.13 (1.63)* 3.25 (2.37)
School Board President 10.05 (1.61)* 5.42 (1.63)* 4.63 (2.17)*
Attorney -1.25 (1.67) -0.46 (1.53) -0.80 (2.26)
Business Executive -2.38 (1.57) -0.62 (1.57) -1.76 (2.14)
Small Business Owner -3.41 (1.58)* -0.31 (1.63) -3.09 (2.25)
Police Officer -3.86 (1.67)* -1.82 (1.67) -2.05 (2.39)
Electrician -5.63 (1.70)* -1.38 (1.76) -4.25 (2.36)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom -7.00 (1.67)* -5.98 (1.76)* -1.02 (2.43)
Asian 0.57 (1.29) 2.01 (1.31) -1.45 (1.74)
Black 0.59 (1.40) 1.40 (1.31) -0.81 (1.77)
Hispanic 0.83 (1.32) 0.79 (1.27) 0.04 (1.77)
65 -0.53 (1.21) -1.92 (1.25) 1.39 (1.74)
55 0.17 (1.21) 0.29 (1.34) -0.12 (1.79)
45 -0.32 (1.17) 0.24 (1.28) -0.56 (1.69)




Representative in Congress 9.33 (1.84)* 10.31 (2.23)* -0.99 (2.82)
Mayor 8.06 (1.85)* 8.99 (2.11)* -0.93 (2.67)
State Legislator 9.12 (2.00)* 7.74 (2.12)* 1.38 (3.08)
City Council Member 7.51 (1.97)* 8.68 (1.95)* -1.17 (2.65)
School Board President 6.33 (1.76)* 5.92 (2.06)* 0.41 (2.77)
Attorney 0.24 (2.25) -0.48 (1.91) 0.72 (2.86)
Business Executive 3.91 (1.88)* 3.73 (1.97) 0.18 (2.76)
Small Business Owner 3.56 (1.95) 6.82 (2.07)* -3.26 (2.73)
Police Officer 4.11 (1.98)* 4.17 (2.12)* -0.06 (2.97)
Electrician -2.31 (2.04) 2.93 (1.96) -5.24 (2.77)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom -3.89 (2.00) -1.13 (2.11) -2.75 (2.81)
Asian -2.27 (1.37) 0.07 (1.40) -2.34 (1.96)
Black -4.27 (1.47)* -1.67 (1.49) -2.60 (2.00)
Hispanic -1.78 (1.60) -2.57 (1.59) 0.79 (2.11)
65 -0.98 (1.44) 0.88 (1.55) -1.85 (2.14)
55 -0.13 (1.43) 0.45 (1.60) -0.58 (2.19)
45 -0.02 (1.37) -0.85 (1.46) 0.83 (2.11)
Male 2.48 (1.04)* 1.61 (1.15) 0.87 (1.51)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress 0.13 (0.07) 0.10 (0.07) 0.02 (0.10)
Mayor 0.28 (0.07)* 0.13 (0.07) 0.15 (0.10)
State Legislator 0.21 (0.07)* 0.17 (0.07)* 0.04 (0.09)
City Council Member 0.16 (0.07)* 0.21 (0.07)* -0.05 (0.09)
Attorney 0.18 (0.07)* 0.11 (0.06) 0.07 (0.09)
Business Executive 0.13 (0.07) -0.05 (0.06) 0.18 (0.10)
Small Business Owner 0.13 (0.06)* 0.10 (0.06) 0.04 (0.09)
Police Officer 0.47 (0.07)* 0.26 (0.07)* 0.21 (0.10)*
Asian 0.08 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) 0.05 (0.08)
Black -0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.07) -0.02 (0.09)
Hispanic 0.00 (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) -0.08 (0.08)
65 0.01 (0.06) -0.02 (0.06) 0.03 (0.08)
55 0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.08)
45 0.04 (0.06) -0.00 (0.06) 0.04 (0.08)




Representative in Congress 0.27 (0.11)* 0.17 (0.10) 0.10 (0.15)
Mayor 0.36 (0.10)* 0.14 (0.11) 0.22 (0.15)
State Legislator 0.28 (0.11)* 0.15 (0.11) 0.12 (0.16)
City Council Member 0.14 (0.11) 0.07 (0.11) 0.07 (0.15)
Attorney 0.21 (0.11) 0.02 (0.11) 0.18 (0.15)
Business Executive 0.40 (0.11)* -0.01 (0.12) 0.41 (0.16)*
Small Business Owner 0.35 (0.11)* 0.22 (0.10)* 0.13 (0.14)
Police Officer 0.67 (0.11)* 0.34 (0.11)* 0.32 (0.14)*
Asian -0.03 (0.09) -0.20 (0.08)* 0.17 (0.12)
Black -0.24 (0.09)* -0.15 (0.09) -0.09 (0.13)
Hispanic -0.14 (0.09) -0.10 (0.08) -0.04 (0.11)
65 -0.10 (0.09) 0.05 (0.08) -0.15 (0.13)
55 0.03 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) -0.09 (0.13)
45 0.02 (0.10) 0.09 (0.10) -0.06 (0.14)
Male -0.00 (0.08) 0.18 (0.07)* -0.18 (0.10)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress 0.17 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) 0.07 (0.14)
Mayor 0.30 (0.10)* -0.09 (0.09) 0.39 (0.13)*
State Legislator 0.34 (0.09)* 0.11 (0.09) 0.23 (0.12)
City Council Member 0.33 (0.08)* 0.14 (0.09) 0.19 (0.12)
School Board President 0.25 (0.08)* 0.06 (0.10) 0.19 (0.13)
Attorney 0.15 (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) 0.14 (0.13)
Business Executive 0.02 (0.10) 0.03 (0.09) -0.01 (0.14)
Small Business Owner -0.01 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) -0.11 (0.15)
Police Officer 0.18 (0.10) 0.17 (0.09) 0.01 (0.13)
Electrician -0.14 (0.10) -0.14 (0.10) -0.00 (0.14)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom -0.06 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10) 0.09 (0.14)
Asian 0.04 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07) -0.07 (0.10)
Black 0.10 (0.07) 0.19 (0.07)* -0.08 (0.10)
Hispanic -0.00 (0.08) 0.20 (0.07)* -0.20 (0.10)
65 0.03 (0.07) -0.09 (0.07) 0.12 (0.10)
55 -0.05 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07) 0.02 (0.10)
45 -0.00 (0.07) -0.05 (0.08) 0.04 (0.10)




Representative in Congress 0.14 (0.10) 0.16 (0.12) -0.02 (0.16)
Mayor -0.05 (0.10) 0.23 (0.12)* -0.28 (0.16)
State Legislator 0.03 (0.10) 0.10 (0.12) -0.07 (0.16)
City Council Member -0.00 (0.10) 0.18 (0.11) -0.19 (0.15)
School Board President 0.06 (0.10) -0.01 (0.11) 0.07 (0.15)
Attorney 0.36 (0.12)* 0.05 (0.12) 0.30 (0.16)
Business Executive 0.50 (0.11)* 0.09 (0.12) 0.41 (0.17)*
Small Business Owner 0.56 (0.12)* 0.34 (0.12)* 0.22 (0.17)
Police Officer 0.81 (0.13)* 0.49 (0.13)* 0.32 (0.18)
Electrician 0.27 (0.12)* 0.11 (0.12) 0.16 (0.16)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom 0.33 (0.12)* 0.11 (0.11) 0.22 (0.16)
Asian -0.03 (0.08) -0.02 (0.09) -0.01 (0.12)
Black -0.28 (0.09)* -0.08 (0.10) -0.19 (0.13)
Hispanic -0.21 (0.09)* -0.12 (0.10) -0.09 (0.13)
65 -0.15 (0.08) 0.10 (0.10) -0.25 (0.13)
55 -0.10 (0.09) 0.09 (0.09) -0.19 (0.13)
45 -0.01 (0.08) 0.10 (0.09) -0.11 (0.12)
Male 0.12 (0.06) 0.04 (0.07) 0.08 (0.10)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
APPENDIX A. CANDIDATE CHOICE WITHOUT PARTY LABELS 128





Representative in Congress 0.15 (0.07)* -0.00 (0.08) 0.15 (0.11)
Mayor 0.24 (0.07)* 0.10 (0.07) 0.13 (0.10)
State Legislator 0.16 (0.07)* 0.11 (0.08) 0.06 (0.10)
City Council Member 0.13 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07) 0.01 (0.10)
Attorney 0.27 (0.07)* 0.20 (0.07)* 0.07 (0.10)
Business Executive 0.62 (0.08)* 0.38 (0.08)* 0.24 (0.11)*
Small Business Owner 0.67 (0.08)* 0.42 (0.08)* 0.25 (0.11)*
Police Officer 0.40 (0.07)* 0.28 (0.08)* 0.12 (0.10)
Asian -0.03 (0.06) -0.02 (0.07) -0.01 (0.08)
Black -0.13 (0.06)* -0.17 (0.07)* 0.04 (0.09)
Hispanic -0.14 (0.06)* -0.06 (0.07) -0.08 (0.09)
65 0.18 (0.06)* -0.02 (0.07) 0.21 (0.09)*
55 0.16 (0.06)* -0.03 (0.06) 0.19 (0.09)*
45 0.12 (0.06) -0.04 (0.06) 0.16 (0.09)




Representative in Congress -0.08 (0.11) 0.17 (0.12) -0.24 (0.17)
Mayor 0.07 (0.12) 0.12 (0.12) -0.05 (0.16)
State Legislator -0.09 (0.10) 0.15 (0.12) -0.24 (0.16)
City Council Member -0.02 (0.11) 0.10 (0.13) -0.12 (0.16)
Attorney 0.27 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.12) 0.21 (0.16)
Business Executive 0.53 (0.13)* 0.19 (0.12) 0.34 (0.17)*
Small Business Owner 0.62 (0.13)* 0.51 (0.12)* 0.11 (0.17)
Police Officer 0.30 (0.11)* 0.10 (0.13) 0.20 (0.18)
Asian -0.12 (0.09) -0.15 (0.11) 0.03 (0.14)
Black -0.39 (0.11)* -0.17 (0.11) -0.22 (0.15)
Hispanic -0.19 (0.10)* -0.15 (0.12) -0.04 (0.15)
65 0.05 (0.10) -0.07 (0.11) 0.12 (0.15)
55 -0.01 (0.10) 0.11 (0.11) -0.12 (0.15)
45 0.17 (0.10) 0.15 (0.11) 0.02 (0.16)
Male 0.17 (0.08)* 0.08 (0.07) 0.09 (0.10)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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Representative in Congress -0.05 (0.10) -0.02 (0.10) -0.03 (0.14)
Mayor -0.03 (0.09) 0.04 (0.09) -0.07 (0.13)
State Legislator 0.03 (0.09) 0.14 (0.09) -0.11 (0.13)
City Council Member -0.09 (0.09) 0.02 (0.10) -0.10 (0.13)
School Board President -0.05 (0.08) 0.11 (0.10) -0.16 (0.13)
Attorney 0.02 (0.10) 0.05 (0.11) -0.03 (0.15)
Business Executive 0.44 (0.10)* 0.02 (0.10) 0.42 (0.14)*
Small Business Owner 0.34 (0.09)* 0.03 (0.11) 0.30 (0.15)*
Police Officer 0.12 (0.09) 0.14 (0.10) -0.02 (0.13)
Electrician 0.08 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10) 0.13 (0.14)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom 0.09 (0.08) -0.16 (0.10) 0.25 (0.14)
Asian -0.07 (0.08) 0.00 (0.07) -0.07 (0.11)
Black -0.06 (0.07) 0.04 (0.08) -0.11 (0.10)
Hispanic -0.13 (0.07) -0.15 (0.07)* 0.02 (0.10)
65 0.21 (0.07)* -0.03 (0.08) 0.24 (0.10)*
55 0.13 (0.07)* -0.06 (0.08) 0.19 (0.11)
45 0.11 (0.07) 0.04 (0.08) 0.07 (0.10)




Representative in Congress -0.19 (0.12) 0.03 (0.12) -0.22 (0.17)
Mayor -0.03 (0.10) 0.14 (0.11) -0.16 (0.14)
State Legislator -0.11 (0.10) -0.00 (0.12) -0.11 (0.16)
City Council Member -0.01 (0.11) -0.06 (0.12) 0.06 (0.15)
School Board President -0.10 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) -0.11 (0.16)
Attorney 0.07 (0.10) 0.05 (0.13) 0.02 (0.16)
Business Executive 0.48 (0.13)* 0.34 (0.14)* 0.14 (0.18)
Small Business Owner 0.63 (0.13)* 0.36 (0.12)* 0.26 (0.17)
Police Officer 0.37 (0.12)* 0.25 (0.13)* 0.12 (0.17)
Electrician 0.27 (0.13)* 0.29 (0.13)* -0.01 (0.18)
Stay-at-Home Dad/Mom 0.10 (0.12) 0.17 (0.13) -0.07 (0.18)
Asian -0.11 (0.09) 0.13 (0.09) -0.24 (0.12)*
Black -0.37 (0.10)* -0.15 (0.10) -0.22 (0.14)
Hispanic -0.16 (0.08)* -0.09 (0.10) -0.07 (0.12)
65 0.07 (0.09) -0.01 (0.09) 0.08 (0.13)
55 0.04 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.01 (0.12)
45 -0.06 (0.09) -0.11 (0.09) 0.04 (0.12)
Male 0.14 (0.06)* -0.03 (0.07) 0.17 (0.09)
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p<0.05
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B.1 Validity of the RDD
The “no sorting” assumption is the key identifying assumption of the RDD—that potential out-
comes are smooth across the discontinuity. I tested the validity of the assumption in several ways.
After examining the distribution of the rating variable, which is displayed in Figure B.1, I tested
the density of the rating variable at the threshold per McCrary (2008) and failed to reject the null
hypothesis of no sorting (log difference in heights is -0.187 with SE 0.202; p = 0.355). An al-
ternative local polynomial density technique from Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2017) also yields
no evidence of manipulation around the cutpoint (p = 0.187). Finally, I also conducted a series
of placebo tests. I used local linear regression models similar to those described in the main text
but substituted several pre-treatment covariates as dependent variables to check for a discontinuity
at the cutpoint in the rating variable. Covariates include population, the percent of the popula-
tion that is white, the level of unemployment, the home ownership rate, median household income
and an indicator for mayor-council form of government. I also analyze several lagged dependent
variables. The results are displayed in Tables B.1 and B.2 and provide support for the validity of
the RDD. In each model, the coefficient for Executive Mayor fails to reach statistical significance,
suggesting covariates are not discontinuous at the threshold.
B.2 Results—Spending by Category
In the primary analysis presented in Section 4.2, all dependent variables are measured in constant
(2000) dollars per-capita, and the effects of electing a business executive mayor are estimated us-
ing local linear regression, a 5% bandwidth, and several covariates (population, racial composition,
median household income, median house value, and the lagged dependent variable). Table B.3 pro-
vides details of the results depicted in Figure 3 of the main text. in of alternative specifications and
formulations of the dependent variables. Note again the increased precision of the estimates from
either including covariates or differencing the dependent variable.
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B.2.1 Sensitivity to Bandwidth
Figures B.2 and fig: multi bw 2 present estimates of the effects of electing a business executive
on spending at multiple bandwidths using different operationalizations of the dependent variables.
These figures includes point estimates with 95% confidence intervals constructed using robust
standard errors for housing (B.2(a) and B.2(b)), roads (B.2(c) and B.2(d)), administration (B.3(a)
and B.3(b), and parks (B.3(c) and B.3(d)). For each dependent variable, the first column includes
three panels containing an unadjusted basic model, a covariate adjusted model, and a differenced
dependent variable model. The second column contains similar specifications using logs of all
fiscal outcomes. In each plot, the open point and dotted lines represent the point estimate and
robust bias-corrected confidence interval at the MSE-optimal bandwidth (estimated per Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) using the rdrobust package in R). At narrower bandwidths, the
estimates tend to be larger and noisier, but as the bandwidth increases the estimates are quite stable.
Note that the results presented in Section 4.2 above are quite robust to alternative specifications.
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Table B.1: Placebo Tests
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth
Optimal Bandwidth
Total Revenue (per-capita, lagged) 217.254 (316.562) 0.493 0.104
Total Expenditures (per-capita, lagged) 320.576 (347.274) 0.357 0.101
Total Taxes (per-capita, lagged) 97.527 (102.129) 0.341 0.094
Municipal Form 0.157 (0.122) 0.198 0.090
Population (in thousands) 109.463 (213.204) 0.608 0.105
Percent White 4.980 (4.269) 0.245 0.078
Unemployment Rate -0.585 (0.603) 0.333 0.076
Home-ownership Rate -1.155 (3.169) 0.716 0.049
Median Household Income -7.909 (3197.434) 0.998 0.077
Median House Value ($ in thousands) -25.351 (16.484) 0.125 0.091
5% Bandwidth
Total Revenue (per-capita, lagged) 520.887 (454.980) 0.254 0.050
Total Expenditures (per-capita, lagged) 692.504 (506.563) 0.174 0.050
Total Taxes (per-capita, lagged) 183.662 (122.274) 0.135 0.050
Municipal Form 0.169 (0.158) 0.288 0.050
Population (in thousands) 183.134 (207.415) 0.379 0.050
Percent White 4.462 (5.243) 0.396 0.050
Unemployment Rate -0.408 (0.742) 0.583 0.050
Home-ownership Rate -1.088 (3.161) 0.731 0.050
Median Household Income 708.835 (3920.196) 0.857 0.050
Median House Value ($ in thousands) -30.508 (22.090) 0.169 0.050
Note: Estimated using local linear regression. Robust standard errors reported. Optimal
bandwidths calculated per Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) using rdrobust.
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Table B.2: Placebo Tests
with Robust Bias-Corrected Confidence Intervals
Coefficient Confidence Interval p-value Bandwidth
Total Revenue (per-capita, lagged) 217.256 [-496.226, 1058.050] 0.479 0.104
Total Expenditures (per-capita, lagged) 320.601 [-454.283, 1263.252] 0.356 0.101
Total Taxes (per-capita, lagged) 97.495 [-132.082, 366.792] 0.356 0.094
Municipal Form 0.157 [-0.081, 0.453] 0.173 0.090
Population (in thousands) 109.446 [-332.252, 605.219] 0.568 0.105
Percent White 4.979 [-3.025, 14.363] 0.201 0.078
Unemployment Rate -0.585 [-1.930, 0.727] 0.375 0.076
Home-ownership Rate -1.160 [-10.123, 4.890] 0.494 0.049
Median Household Income -8.266 [-7864.180, 7552.968] 0.968 0.077
Median House Value ($ in thousands) -25.346 [-70.351, 11.315] 0.157 0.091
Note: Estimated using local linear regression. Optimal bandwidth and robust confidence intervals calculated
with rdrobust.
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Table B.3: Spending by Category (Figure 3 of the main text)
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth n
Police -1.55 11.625 0.894 0.05 143
Fire -0.07 6.798 0.992 0.05 143
Administration 11.34 6.210 0.070 0.05 130
Sanitation -0.42 6.218 0.947 0.05 139
Roads 90.22 43.257 0.039 0.05 143
Parks 54.09 30.583 0.079 0.05 143
Libraries 4.13 4.227 0.330 0.05 134
Health -3.62 6.842 0.597 0.05 139
Housing -27.07 11.551 0.021 0.05 140
Welfare -2.39 9.111 0.793 0.05 143
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with covariates. Robust standard errors.
Dependent variables are measured in dollars per-capita; n is the number of observations
within the 0.05 bandwidth.
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Figure B.3: RD Estimates at Multiple Bandwidths
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B.3 Alternative Specifications
B.3.1 Size of Government
In the primary analysis presented in Section 4.1 of the main text, all dependent variables are mea-
sured in constant (2000) dollars per-capita, and the effects of electing a business executive mayor
are estimated using local linear regression. Tables B.4, B.5, B.6 present the results of several
specifications using a bandwidth of 0.05 but with different operationalizations of the dependent
variables. These include a “base model,” with no covariates, the same model with the depen-
dent variable transformed to its log, the covariate-adjusted model, a covariate adjusted model with
logged variables, a model where the dependent variable is the difference between the dependent
variable two years after the election and the year before the election, and the final specification
uses the difference in the logs of the leading and lagged dependent variables. As expected, includ-
ing covariates or differencing the dependent variable consistently produces more precise estimates.
However, neither the substantive nor statistical significance of the RD results depends on a specific
model specification or operationalization of the dependent variables.
B.3.2 Spending by Category
In the primary analysis presented in Section 4.2 of the main text, all dependent variables are mea-
sured in constant (2000) dollars per-capita. Table A3 presents the results of alternative specifi-
cations and formulations of the dependent variables. Note again the increased precision of the
estimates from either including covariates or differencing the dependent variable.
B.3.3 Spending Shares
While I use absolute per-capita spending to measure fiscal policy priorities, an alternative opera-
tionalization of spending is as a share of total expenditures. Table includes the results of an RD
analysis in which the spending dependent variables are operationalized as shares. The decrease in
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Table B.4: Size of Government
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth Specification
Total Revenue 649.83 454.730 0.155 0.05 Base Model
Total Revenue 108.53 108.810 0.320 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Total Revenue 0.32 0.239 0.180 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Total Revenue 0.07 0.059 0.251 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Total Revenue 115.82 123.640 0.350 0.05 Differenced DV
Total Revenue 0.06 0.064 0.317 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Total Debt 404.18 731.953 0.582 0.05 Base Model
Total Debt 374.27 754.691 0.621 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Total Debt 0.08 0.369 0.822 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Total Debt -0.18 0.348 0.599 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Total Debt 419.65 770.347 0.587 0.05 Differenced DV
Total Debt -0.62 0.715 0.390 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Total Expenditures 856.72 548.110 0.120 0.05 Base Model
Total Expenditures 102.56 158.142 0.518 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Total Expenditures 0.39 0.252 0.128 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Total Expenditures 0.09 0.082 0.290 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Total Expenditures 159.55 188.019 0.398 0.05 Differenced DV
Total Expenditures 0.08 0.079 0.304 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with bandwidth of 0.05 and robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars.
the share of spending allocated to housing seems especially robust, but for roads and parks, note
that statistical significance varies across models. Overall, however, the findings presented here are
largely consistent with the main results
B.4 Alternative Estimation Strategy
Among the most recent studies and RDD guides, some advocate the use of robust bias-corrected
confidence intervals in combination with local linear regression and MSE-optimal bandwidths
(For a discussion of using robust bias-corrected confidence intervals for inference, see Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) or Skovron and Titiunik (2016), or for a recent application see de
Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016)). In the main text, I opt to present conventional robust
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Table B.5: Municipal Revenue
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth Specification
Total Own-Source Revenue 361.58 277.897 0.195 0.05 Base Model
Total Own-Source Revenue 158.45 83.749 0.061 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Total Own-Source Revenue 0.33 0.217 0.127 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Total Own-Source Revenue 0.12 0.060 0.041 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Total Own-Source Revenue 124.29 83.384 0.138 0.05 Differenced DV
Total Own-Source Revenue 0.10 0.063 0.121 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Total Taxes 195.85 126.287 0.123 0.05 Base Model
Total Taxes -12.29 47.974 0.798 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Total Taxes 0.20 0.197 0.316 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Total Taxes -0.05 0.079 0.553 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Total Taxes -5.88 51.282 0.909 0.05 Differenced DV
Total Taxes -0.06 0.081 0.449 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Sales Taxes -45.35 35.863 0.208 0.05 Base Model
Sales Taxes 1.27 9.274 0.891 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Sales Taxes -1.35 0.724 0.065 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Sales Taxes 0.03 0.150 0.830 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Sales Taxes -3.39 8.152 0.679 0.05 Differenced DV
Sales Taxes 0.10 0.154 0.522 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Property Taxes 278.41 106.536 0.010 0.05 Base Model
Property Taxes 22.38 38.135 0.558 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Property Taxes 0.76 0.251 0.003 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Property Taxes 0.03 0.086 0.766 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Property Taxes 33.05 42.739 0.441 0.05 Differenced DV
Property Taxes 0.00 0.094 0.973 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Charges & Misc. Revenue 177.72 127.237 0.165 0.05 Base Model
Charges & Misc. Revenue 62.60 38.516 0.106 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Charges & Misc. Revenue 0.22 0.309 0.476 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Charges & Misc. Revenue 0.15 0.086 0.075 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Charges & Misc. Revenue 50.43 38.421 0.192 0.05 Differenced DV
Charges & Misc. Revenue 0.10 0.089 0.278 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with bandwidth of 0.05 and robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars.
standard errors partly because this approach seems better suited to presenting results at multi-
ple bandwidths. However, I have conducted comparable analyses that incorporate robust bias-
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Table B.6: Municipal Debt
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth Specification
Debt Issued 212.66 201.009 0.292 0.05 Base Model
Debt Issued 94.64 123.651 0.445 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Debt Issued -0.36 0.835 0.667 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Debt Issued -0.85 0.795 0.288 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Debt Issued 31.76 134.757 0.814 0.05 Differenced DV
Debt Issued -1.39 0.959 0.151 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Short-term Debt 86.05 45.924 0.063 0.05 Base Model
Short-term Debt 58.96 33.668 0.082 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Short-term Debt 1.04 0.696 0.137 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Short-term Debt 0.61 0.559 0.275 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Short-term Debt 57.36 33.498 0.089 0.05 Differenced DV
Short-term Debt 0.36 0.620 0.566 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with bandwidth of 0.05 and robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars.
corrected confidence intervals, and the results are substantively similar. To facilitate comparison,
the results presented in Tables B.9 and B.10 were estimated using the same covariates used in the
main analyses (population, racial diversity, median household income, median house value, and
the lagged dependent variable). Note the marginal increases in own-source revenue as well as
charges and miscellaneous revenue. When it comes to spending, an increase in spending on roads
is accompanied by a decrease in spending for housing and community development, and increases
in spending on parks and administration are statistically significant at the 10% level.
B.5 The Role of Party
In Section 4.3 of the main text, I consider the possibility that what I describe as the effect of
electing a business executive is actually the effect of electing a Republican mayor. To address this
concern, I focus on the subset of elections where both candidates’ party affiliations are observed
and different. Using this subset, I replicate my main RD analyses to estimate the effect of electing
a business executive. I display selected results in the main text, but the full results are presented
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Table B.7: Spending by Category
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth Specification
Roads 104.19 46.725 0.027 0.05 Base Model
Roads 90.22 43.257 0.039 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Roads 0.54 0.232 0.021 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Roads 0.42 0.192 0.030 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Roads 79.85 44.531 0.075 0.05 Differenced DV
Roads 0.37 0.198 0.065 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Parks 46.75 30.749 0.131 0.05 Base Model
Parks 54.09 30.583 0.079 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Parks 0.40 0.296 0.179 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Parks 0.31 0.221 0.161 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Parks 48.97 35.020 0.164 0.05 Differenced DV
Parks 0.36 0.275 0.192 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Libraries 8.26 5.312 0.122 0.05 Base Model
Libraries 4.13 4.227 0.330 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Libraries 1.00 0.484 0.042 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Libraries -0.19 0.148 0.204 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Libraries -0.96 3.976 0.809 0.05 Differenced DV
Libraries -0.19 0.157 0.219 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Health 0.48 19.742 0.981 0.05 Base Model
Health -3.62 6.842 0.597 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Health 0.23 0.537 0.668 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Health -0.21 0.165 0.215 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Health -3.24 7.045 0.647 0.05 Differenced DV
Health -0.21 0.191 0.275 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Housing -27.75 20.512 0.178 0.05 Base Model
Housing -27.07 11.551 0.021 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Housing -1.72 0.566 0.003 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Housing -0.80 0.312 0.011 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Housing -32.41 15.913 0.044 0.05 Differenced DV
Housing -0.49 0.336 0.144 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Welfare 30.37 28.644 0.291 0.05 Base Model
Welfare -2.39 9.111 0.793 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Welfare 0.94 0.571 0.101 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Welfare 0.22 0.401 0.589 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Welfare -5.08 12.467 0.684 0.05 Differenced DV
Welfare 0.12 0.415 0.780 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with bandwidth of 0.05 and robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars.
below.
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Spending by Category (Cont’d)
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth Specification
Police 16.15 27.821 0.562 0.05 Base Model
Police -1.55 11.625 0.894 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Police 0.00 0.177 0.997 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Police 0.01 0.065 0.875 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Police -2.09 13.693 0.879 0.05 Differenced DV
Police -0.00 0.070 0.981 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Fire 20.21 16.647 0.227 0.05 Base Model
Fire -0.07 6.798 0.992 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Fire 0.41 0.303 0.182 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Fire 0.04 0.066 0.577 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Fire -0.28 7.454 0.970 0.05 Differenced DV
Fire 0.00 0.065 0.946 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Administration 15.28 7.807 0.052 0.05 Base Model
Administration 11.34 6.210 0.070 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Administration 0.56 0.269 0.039 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Administration 0.34 0.177 0.059 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Administration 4.95 6.090 0.418 0.05 Differenced DV
Administration 0.28 0.176 0.115 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Sanitation 5.32 9.637 0.582 0.05 Base Model
Sanitation -0.42 6.218 0.947 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Sanitation 0.58 0.430 0.177 0.05 Base Model - Log DV
Sanitation -0.00 0.139 0.980 0.05 Covariate-adjusted - Log DV
Sanitation -3.29 6.588 0.618 0.05 Differenced DV
Sanitation -0.06 0.137 0.670 0.05 Differenced Log DV
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with bandwidth of 0.05 and robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars.
B.5.1 Effect of Electing a Business Executive
Tables B.11, B.12, B.13, and B.14 include the full results of an RD analysis of the effect of electing
a business executive. Note that the number of observations is quite small, which leads to rather
noisy estimates. However, the increase in spending on roads and decrease in spending on housing
and community development are still apparent.
B.5.2 Effect of Electing a Republican
Tables B.15, B.16, B.17, and B.18 include the full results of an RD analysis of the effect of electing
a Republican mayor. Note again that the number of observations is quite small, which leads to
rather noisy estimates. Although most of the results are null, there is no evidence to suggest that
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Table B.8: Spending Shares
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth Specification
Police -0.045 0.018 0.015 0.05 Base Model
Police -0.010 0.009 0.275 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Police -0.007 0.009 0.466 0.05 Differenced DV
Fire -0.007 0.014 0.613 0.05 Base Model
Fire -0.004 0.005 0.372 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Fire -0.005 0.006 0.424 0.05 Differenced DV
Administration 0.003 0.005 0.611 0.05 Base Model
Administration 0.007 0.005 0.171 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Administration 0.007 0.007 0.294 0.05 Differenced DV
Sanitation -0.005 0.008 0.559 0.05 Base Model
Sanitation -0.000 0.006 0.964 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Sanitation -0.001 0.008 0.911 0.05 Differenced DV
Roads 0.011 0.024 0.639 0.05 Base Model
Roads 0.028 0.022 0.203 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Roads 0.042 0.021 0.045 0.05 Differenced DV
Parks -0.001 0.015 0.928 0.05 Base Model
Parks 0.011 0.014 0.438 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Parks 0.024 0.014 0.081 0.05 Differenced DV
Libraries 0.001 0.003 0.680 0.05 Base Model
Libraries -0.000 0.003 0.930 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Libraries -0.002 0.003 0.420 0.05 Differenced DV
Health -0.004 0.005 0.426 0.05 Base Model
Health -0.000 0.002 0.917 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Health -0.000 0.002 0.893 0.05 Differenced DV
Housing -0.039 0.018 0.034 0.05 Base Model
Housing -0.028 0.010 0.006 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Housing -0.026 0.010 0.014 0.05 Differenced DV
Welfare 0.006 0.006 0.279 0.05 Base Model
Welfare -0.003 0.003 0.444 0.05 Covariate-adjusted
Welfare -0.006 0.006 0.347 0.05 Differenced DV
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with bandwidth of 0.05 and robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured as their share of total expenditures.
the effect of electing a business executive is instead capturing the effect of electing a Republican.
Indeed, the coefficient on spending for roads is negative and barely significant at the 10% level,
while most of the results are null.
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Table B.9: Size of Government
with Robust Bias-Corrected Confidence Intervals
Robust Standard
Coefficient Confidence Interval p-value Bandwidth N Mean Deviation
Total Revenue 124.05 [-122.79, 388.29] 0.309 0.066 181 1495.28 995.39
Total Own-Source Revenue 151.68 [-3.69, 362.54] 0.055 0.056 154 1169.35 748.06
Total Taxes -11.98 [-104.00, 82.39] 0.820 0.083 213 556.18 383.23
Sales Taxes 1.95 [-17.38, 21.89] 0.822 0.053 148 126.95 132.27
Property Taxes 14.37 [-62.57, 102.94] 0.633 0.074 197 371.26 357.42
Charges & Misc. Revenue 56.05 [-8.64, 142.63] 0.083 0.057 155 315.62 261.18
Total Debt 279.77 [-705.35, 1569.02] 0.457 0.084 214 1765.33 1478.05
Debt Issued 142.33 [-145.95, 463.36] 0.307 0.074 197 251.45 370.93
Short-term Debt 47.95 [-14.97, 133.82] 0.117 0.062 168 60.68 194.71
Total Expenditures 135.42 [-127.08, 430.05] 0.287 0.093 234 1506.89 1053.30
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with covariates. Optimal bandwidth and robust confidence intervals calculated
with rdrobust. Dependent variables are measured in dollars per-capita; n is the number of observations within the optimal
bandwidth.
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Table B.10: Spending by Category
with Robust Bias-Corrected Confidence Intervals
Robust Standard
Coefficient Confidence Interval p-value Bandwidth N Mean Deviation
Roads 62.30 [10.87, 133.63] 0.021 0.079 202 103.30 73.65
Parks 35.81 [-4.70, 97.19] 0.075 0.082 210 72.74 71.27
Administration 8.33 [-1.37, 20.93] 0.086 0.074 182 27.32 21.32
Libraries 4.68 [-3.20, 15.30] 0.200 0.047 129 17.12 20.78
Health -1.27 [-17.40, 11.02] 0.660 0.063 167 21.03 60.62
Fire -1.33 [-11.91, 12.74] 0.947 0.083 213 95.24 48.21
Sanitation -1.12 [-12.49, 12.65] 0.990 0.076 195 41.49 32.10
Welfare -5.39 [-23.88, 10.76] 0.458 0.107 268 22.18 76.94
Police -5.47 [-30.08, 18.27] 0.632 0.074 197 144.96 74.69
Housing -26.04 [-57.44, -1.23] 0.041 0.055 151 51.51 75.92
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with covariates. Optimal bandwidth and robust confidence intervals calculated
with rdrobust. Dependent variables are measured in dollars per-capita; n is the number of observations within the optimal
bandwidth.
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Table B.11: Size of Government—Two-party Subset
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Revenues 1,591.96 444.88 532.30 8.41 2.10
(1,133.07) (525.25) (676.95) (142.59) (153.16)
Bandwidth 0.089 0.050 0.058 0.050
Observations 103 72 72 69
Total Debt 1,836.07 115.30 121.68 2.57 73.91
(1,421.27) (761.70) (1,084.12) (867.78) (1,122.46)
Bandwidth 0.095 0.050 0.073 0.050
Observations 109 72 90 69
Total Expenditures 1,622.32 655.52 849.61 121.67 148.85
(1,246.84) (599.94) (812.65) (195.59) (252.72)
Bandwidth 0.097 0.050 0.071 0.050
Observations 109 72 86 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
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Table B.12: Municipal Revenue—Two-party Subset
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Own-source 1,214.06 97.03 110.34 47.80 45.77
Revenues (797.08) (341.23) (421.55) (90.50) (90.08)
Bandwidth 0.077 0.050 0.049 0.050
Observations 93 72 67 69
Total Taxes 632.40 86.31 171.94 −81.28 −95.74
(473.12) (161.15) (171.59) (66.47) (77.33)
Bandwidth 0.076 0.050 0.067 0.050
Observations 93 72 84 69
Property Taxes 438.61 310.75∗∗ 314.91∗∗ −15.53 −19.47
(429.80) (133.98) (136.20) (51.06) (55.93)
Bandwidth 0.054 0.050 0.067 0.050
Observations 74 72 84 69
Sales Taxes 117.10 −50.12 −63.90 −2.33 −7.77
(146.29) (47.93) (54.73) (12.70) (12.48)
Bandwidth 0.084 0.050 0.063 0.050
Observations 100 72 76 69
Charges and Misc. 307.87 144.95 169.59 64.29 69.20
Revenue (258.95) (130.07) (181.20) (48.21) (56.18)
Bandwidth 0.091 0.050 0.064 0.050
Observations 106 72 78 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
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Table B.13: Municipal Debt—Two-party Subset
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt Issued 269.52 264.70 266.88 −16.46 −18.08
(402.44) (242.03) (287.93) (120.27) (121.97)
Bandwidth 0.073 0.050 0.052 0.050
Observations 93 72 69 69
Short-term Debt 110.22 140.06∗ 131.24∗ 45.82 69.79
(283.92) (76.36) (77.09) (44.66) (48.47)
Bandwidth 0.058 0.050 0.070 0.050
Observations 75 72 86 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
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Table B.14: Spending by Category—Two-party Subset
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth N
Police -6.79 19.335 0.727 0.05 69
Fire -11.31 11.361 0.324 0.05 69
Administration 3.14 8.118 0.701 0.05 62
Sanitation -4.07 9.359 0.665 0.05 67
Roads 147.16 63.596 0.024 0.05 69
Parks 53.65 44.929 0.237 0.05 69
Libraries 2.87 6.961 0.682 0.05 64
Health -5.37 10.323 0.605 0.05 67
Housing -39.81 18.490 0.035 0.05 68
Welfare 4.80 12.117 0.694 0.05 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars.
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Table B.15: Size of Government—Effect of Electing a Republican
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Revenues 1,591.96 302.76 18.05 −66.44 −61.10
(1,133.07) (578.62) (711.62) (147.75) (159.33)
Bandwidth 0.075 0.050 0.058 0.050
Observations 93 72 72 69
Total Debt 1,836.07 762.87 458.96 497.91 385.28
(1,421.27) (717.58) (1,116.80) (1,011.83) (1,134.29)
Bandwidth 0.113 0.050 0.062 0.050
Observations 132 72 75 69
Total Expenditures 1,622.32 40.35 −365.11 −334.70 −346.91
(1,246.84) (671.67) (848.63) (208.15) (258.48)
Bandwidth 0.078 0.050 0.069 0.050
Observations 93 72 85 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
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Table B.16: Municipal Revenue—Effect of Electing a Republican
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Own-source 1,214.06 318.28 220.19 3.89 4.91
Revenues (797.08) (393.48) (435.21) (85.90) (85.07)
Bandwidth 0.064 0.050 0.049 0.050
Observations 81 72 67 69
Total Taxes 632.40 233.54 193.82 54.43 71.13
(473.12) (182.71) (198.42) (58.41) (88.95)
Bandwidth 0.075 0.050 0.103 0.050
Observations 93 72 112 69
Property Taxes 438.61 114.94 100.03 36.26 40.95
(429.80) (148.47) (157.08) (54.01) (69.35)
Bandwidth 0.063 0.050 0.074 0.050
Observations 79 72 90 69
Sales Taxes 117.10 54.53 28.51 −12.06 −13.60
(146.29) (52.48) (55.92) (8.54) (9.82)
Bandwidth 0.072 0.050 0.069 0.050
Observations 92 72 85 69
Charges and Misc. 307.87 −29.55 −116.07 −43.65 −49.23
Revenue (258.95) (115.18) (183.07) (53.94) (58.04)
Bandwidth 0.104 0.050 0.057 0.050
Observations 119 72 72 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
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Table B.17: Municipal Debt—Effect of Electing a Republican
Dependent Mean &
Variable Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt Issued 269.52 −183.74 −280.39 −364.54∗∗ −342.31∗∗
(402.44) (260.41) (291.94) (160.81) (154.21)
Bandwidth 0.063 0.050 0.046 0.050
Observations 81 72 65 69
Short-term Debt 110.22 60.57 97.22 77.26 82.38
(283.92) (75.28) (80.67) (56.44) (58.11)
Bandwidth 0.066 0.050 0.057 0.050
Observations 84 72 72 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05
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Table B.18: Spending by Category—Effect of Electing a Republican
Coefficient Std. Error p-value Bandwidth N
Police -26.62 22.253 0.236 0.05 69
Fire 1.94 10.572 0.855 0.05 69
Administration 8.05 8.193 0.330 0.05 62
Sanitation -0.68 7.925 0.932 0.05 67
Roads -102.32 61.130 0.099 0.05 69
Parks -33.75 41.790 0.422 0.05 69
Libraries 5.27 5.739 0.362 0.05 64
Health -9.19 10.167 0.370 0.05 67
Housing -2.56 16.438 0.877 0.05 68
Welfare -8.21 11.397 0.474 0.05 69
Note: Estimated using local linear regression with robust standard errors.
Dependent variables measured in per-capita dollars.
